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Cut in Tiny Pieces: Ensuring That 
Fragmented Ownership Does Not 
Chill Creativity 
Henry H. Perritt, Jr.* 
ABSTRACT 
The market for video entertainment is growing and becoming 
more diverse as technology reduces barriers to entry for small, 
independent moviemakers and distributors and increases consumers’ 
ability to access the media of their choice. The growing complexity of 
the market, however, increases transaction costs for new entrants who 
must obtain licenses to copyrighted music, characters, storylines, or 
scenes that they incorporate into their movies. The entertainment 
bonanza offered by new technologies may not be realized in practice 
because of market failure. The purposes of the Copyright and Patents 
Clause are frustrated because creators of new works wishing to use new 
technologies to build on prior creative effort confront a legal regime 
intertwined with older technologies and industry structures. 
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This Article argues that the market needs new public and 
private law mechanisms to make it function more efficiently, by 
making it easier for creators of new works to (1) find the owners of 
preexisting content and (2) overcome other barriers to obtaining 
licenses, such as strategic behavior, irrational protection of entrenched 
bureaucracies, and obsolete, embedded capital. This Article begins with 
a hypothetical story of an independent moviemaker. It explains the 
problems that he confronts in making his movie, explores the 
relationship between the structure of the market for entertainment 
works and the circumstances that have traditionally justified legal 
intervention in a market economy, analyzes various models for such 
intervention, and proposes legislative, common law, and equitable 
solutions to mitigate the problems. The proposals afford a privilege for 
a new creator to use preexisting works when he cannot identify the 
holders of rights in the preexisting work, when he is unsuccessful in 
communicating with those rights holders, or when he proposes a 
reasonable royalty and is rebuffed.  
The purpose of copyright law is to encourage and reward 
creative effort. Current conditions frustrate achievement of that goal by 
making it easy for copyright owners to hide and then ambush creators 
of new works that build upon existing works. Amendment of the 
Copyright Act or application of the interpretive principles proposed in 
this article would further the law’s purpose. 
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The market for video entertainment is growing and becoming 
more diverse as technology reduces barriers to entry for small, 
independent moviemakers and distributors and increases consumers’ 
ability to access the media of their choice.1  The growing complexity of 
the market, however, increases the likelihood that new entrants must 
obtain licenses to copyrighted music, characters, storylines, or scenes 
that they incorporate into their movies.  It additionally increases the 
already-daunting transaction costs for licensing of these rights.  As a 
result, there is a risk that the entertainment bonanza offered by new 
technologies will not be realized in practice because of market failure. 
This Article argues that the market needs new public and 
private law mechanisms to make it function more efficiently, by 
making it easier for creators of new works to (1) find the owners of 
preexisting content and (2) overcome other barriers to obtaining 
licenses, such as strategic behavior, irrational protection of entrenched 
bureaucracies, and obsolete, embedded capital.  This Article begins 
with a hypothetical story of an independent moviemaker, explains the 
problems that he confronts in making his movie, explores the 
relationship between the structure of the market for entertainment 
works and the circumstances that have traditionally justified legal 
intervention in a market economy, analyzes various models for such 
intervention, and proposes legislative, common law, and equitable 
solutions to mitigate the problems. 
I. BLAKE’S PROBLEM2 
Blake Cannon is an independent moviemaker.  He has just 
finished shooting a movie from a screenplay written by one of his 
classmates, Ian Mason, who, like Blake, recently graduated from 
Chicago’s Columbia College with a degree in filmmaking.  The 
 
 1.  See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Technologies of Storytelling: New Models for Movies, 10 
VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 106 (2010). 
 2.  The story set forth in this section is entirely fictional. It represents a hypothetical 
intended to frame the issues explored in the article. 
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screenplay adapts some of the characters and part of the story line 
from a popular play, Hit and Hide, which the playwright adapted from 
a novel entitled Driton.  The screenplay incorporates all or part of six 
popular songs, sung or played by characters in various scenes.  One is 
“Happy Birthday.”  Another is “American Idiot,” by Green Day.  
Others are less well known, initially distributed on MySpace and 
YouTube. 
Blake put together a shoestring budget, recruited other 
classmates for the cast, completed principal photography, and finished 
a marathon editing session.  The result was a respectable initial cut of 
the movie.  Needing a break and feeling euphoric about the results, he 
threw on some jeans and a tee shirt, and headed for his favorite bar.  
He was delighted to see one of his best friends from high school there, 
a young lawyer named Sean Sterling.  Blake told him about the movie 
project and his enthusiasm about the movie’s likely reception on the 
indie-movie-festival circuit. 
“That’s great, bro!”  Sean said.  “When can I see it?” 
Blake only briefly hesitated over the possibility that the initial 
edit was too raw to be exhibited.  After all, it was a damn good cut.  
“You bet,” he said. “Where should we watch it?” 
“Can you come to our condo tomorrow evening? How about 
eight o’clock? We should be home by then.” 
“I’ll be there,” Blake said, and ordered him another round. 
Blake nervously arrived at Sean’s upscale condo the next 
evening.  Sean opened the door immediately.  He already had the DVD 
tray open on the player attached to his big flat-screen TV.  Blake 
pulled the DVD out of his pocket, put it in the tray, and waited to 
push the “play” button until Sean’s boyfriend, Chase Krebs, sat on the 
couch to join them. 
Once Chase had arrived, Blake took a breath and pressed the 
button.  Sean scooted over a bit and patted on the couch for Blake to 
sit down as well.  No one said anything for the 75-minute run time.  
Blake glanced over from time to time to gauge their reactions.  After 
the credits rolled at the end, he got up, pushed the stop button, and 
continued standing, facing the other two. 
“That’s awesome, dude!”  Sean said after a moment.  “Simply 
awesome!” He was full of questions about the story’s development, the 
cast, and various details of the shooting.  Drawn in, Blake took no 
notice for a good ten minutes of the fact that Chase, usually the more 
effervescent of the two, was not saying much. 
“You didn’t like it as much as Sean apparently did,” Blake said 
to Chase, finally. 
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“Oh, I think it’s terrific too.  You should be proud of it.  We’re 
honored to have such an artist in our humble abode.” 
“But?” said Blake. 
“Well, I was just wondering: Have you obtained rights to 
everything you used in the movie?”  Blake remembered that Chase 
recently did some copyright clearance work for a musician friend. 
“It’s an original work,” Blake said, more defensively than he 
intended. 
“I thought Sean said you used a play as your starting point.” 
“Ian only used the play for inspiration.” 
“But you used characters from the play and from the novel on 
which the play was based, didn’t you?” 
“Yes,” said Blake, starting to become annoyed.  “Surely 
characters cannot be copyrighted.” 
“Well . . .” said Chase.  “And not all of the songs are original, 
are they?” 
“No, of course not,” said Blake.  “We needed short sections of a 
couple of well-known songs to set the mood for certain scenes.  As you 
saw, most of them played on the radio or off of a character’s iPod.” 
“Didn’t you say that you pulled one off of MySpace?”  Chase 
persisted.  “That one is not so well known.” 
Sean stood up to fetch some more beer, “Chase may have a 
point,” he said. 
Just terrific, thought Blake, completely deflated.  “Maybe I 
need to do some more editing,” he reluctantly said. 
“No, no!” said Chase.  “Don’t change a thing—except for 
smoothing it out a bit, or whatever else you had planned to do.  Sean 
and I will help you get the copyright clearances you need.  If this 
movie makes it big, you don’t want to get tangled up in a bunch of 
lawsuits that would not only take all the movie revenue, but bankrupt 
you personally.” 
“No, that’s for sure,” said Blake, trying to decide if he felt 
better or not. 
Chase pulled a yellow pad toward him on the coffee table with 
his bare foot, and looked at it. “I counted twenty-five separate 
copyright clearances you need to get,” he said.  Blake hadn’t even 
noticed him taking notes. 
“Did you count the director of the play?” said Sean.  “He or she 
was probably a member of the Stage Directors and Choreographers 
Society.  Their union agreement assures the director of vaguely 
defined ‘property’ rights in the play.” 
“Right,” said Chase. “Twenty-six.” 
“That’s a lot,” said Blake, feeling dispirited again. 
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“We’ll get to work on it right away,” said Chase with 
enthusiasm.  “It will be good experience.  It’s a great movie, and we’ll 
be honored to bask in the glow of your success when you win an 
Academy Award.” 
“Anyway,” said Sean. “You’re our friend.” 
“Feeling better,” Blake lifted his beer bottle in a salute.  
“Already outside counsel for my production company.  Shall we call it 
‘Sterling and Krebs’ or ‘Krebs and Sterling?’” 
“How about ‘Chase Sean’?” said Chase.  Everyone laughed and 
they drank some more beer. 
Six months later, the deadline for most of the movie festivals 
had passed, while Blake, Chase, and Sean were still working to obtain 
clearance of the copyrights.  Blake was extremely frustrated, but had 
taken advantage of the delay to complete several more edits and was 
eager to get his movie into distribution.  He had several expressions of 
interest, fueled by his aborted effort to mount it in the now-past 
festival season. 
The rights in the musical work “Happy Birthday” were owned 
by Warner Music Group.  All Blake needed was performance rights for 
the musical work because the movie did not play someone else’s sound 
recording; the cast sang it themselves.  Everyone knows “Happy 
Birthday.”  But Sean and Chase learned that Warner Music Group 
charges a standard fee of $10,000 for its use in a movie.3  That was 
approximately one-third of their total budget. 
They found contact information for the producer of “Hit and 
Hide” only with difficulty.  Since he did not respond to emails, Chase 
was forced to send him a certified letter, return receipt requested, 
addressed to him, in care of the off-Broadway theatre where he 
produced the play.  That elicited a response from the producer’s 
lawyer, insisting on an up-front fee of $5,000, plus a 20 percent royalty 
on the gross receipts from Blake’s movie. 
The director of Hit and Hide responded more promptly and 
insisted on another $5,000 plus a 10 percent royalty.  Then she added 
a new complication: She was granting only live performance rights, 
not streaming rights.  Sean wrote her back and said they would have 
to think about it.  He regretted telling her that they already expected 
to get rights from the producer; she clearly intended to use that as 
 
 3.  Happy Birthday to You Song is Copyrighted: Be Careful When You Sing this Song, 
ASSOCIATED CONTENT (April 22, 2010), http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/2912852/happy_ 
birthday_to_you_song_is_copyrighted.html (reporting on royalty amounts sought for use of the 
song in a movie). 
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leverage because they would not be able to use the rights licensed 
from the producer without a license from her as well. 
Green Day, interestingly enough, was the easiest.  Sean was 
astonished—and delighted—to get an email from Billie Joe Armstrong 
himself, granting a license for $250 total.  Sean had explained that the 
movie played the first thirty seconds of the song in a scene portraying 
one of the characters listening to it and characterizing it as his 
favorite song.  Armstrong’s email said he thought that was “cool” and 
he was glad to lend some of his music to a good cause. 
A relatively obscure song from a World War II-era musical 
proved especially frustrating. Hal Leonard apparently owned the 
rights to the musical work, but not to the sound recording.  The 
excerpt in Blake’s movie came from a cast recording, so they needed 
sound-recording as well as musical-work rights.  Leonard responded to 
Chase’s requests for license terms with a letter explaining that a 
distant heir of the composer asserted that Leonard’s rights had lapsed 
and that several heirs now owned the work.  The letter further 
explained that Leonard had the power to grant reproduction and 
public-performance rights, but perhaps not streaming rights, because 
streaming surely had not been in the contemplation of its original 
transferor, who had reserved “all other rights.” 
Blake couldn’t find the MySpace page from which he had 
downloaded the other song.  It seemed to have been removed, either by 
its sponsor or by MySpace itself. 
Blake insisted on a meeting with Sean and Chase.  “This is 
never going to end,” he said to them. “I really appreciate all the effort 
you guys have put into this, but it seems like every time we get one 
problem solved, two more pop up.” 
“I can’t disagree with you,” said Sean. “I had no idea it would 
prove so difficult.” 
“Nor did I,” said Chase. 
“So what are my options?” said Blake. 
“You can go ahead and release it, and forget about obtaining 
rights,” said Chase. 
“The downside is that if it is successful, one of the rights 
holders can come out of the woodwork, sue you, and obtain an 
injunction against further exhibition.” 
“Or,” said Chase, “you could edit out all the stuff to which you 
do not have permission.” 
“No way!” said Blake.  “I’d have to start over. Some of the most 
powerful scenes develop character traits around music being sung or 
listened to. I can’t just cut the music out; it would leave ridiculous 
holes throughout the movie.  Ian, assuming he’s not completely tied up 
2011] FIXING FRAGMENTED COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP 9 
 
in other projects now, will have to rewrite the scenes, then I’ll have to 
round up the actors, assuming they are available, reshoot the scenes, 
and start the editing process all over again.” 
Sean and Chase looked at each other for a long moment. 
“I think you should just go ahead,” said Sean.  “If someone gets 
an injunction, you’ll be no worse off than if you go back and rework it 
now. And if you release it, you’ll get some exposure—even more if 
someone sues you.”  He and Sean laughed heartily. 
“So you are encouraging me to do what the music and movie 
industry says is the moral equivalent of shoplifting or house 
burglary?” 
“That’s right,” said Chase.  “We’ll come visit you in prison.” 
Blake gave them both a sarcastic look; he was less than 
amused.  He made an obscene gesture.  “But we’ll come see the movie 
beforehand—early, before they shut it down,” said Sean. He and 
Chase laughed again, and Blake joined them, but with a little less 
enthusiasm. 
A few days later, Blake, Sean, and Chase met in Sean’s office. 
“I’m sorry we haven’t been able to do a better job of clearing the 
rights for you,” said Sean.  “But we want to talk about how you can go 
forward in a way that minimizes your risks.” 
“You don’t want to come see me in jail, after all?” Blake said. 
“No,” said Chase, “and we think there are some ways to 
mitigate other kinds of risks as well.” 
“The first thing to do is to be specific about what you need or 
want to use for free,” said Sean. 
“Then we should identify those aspects of your movie that you 
should be willing to pay someone else for the privilege of using,” said 
Chase.  “For both of these categories, we will help you write an artistic 
analysis—if I may call it that—justifying the need to make use of 
someone else’s creation.” 
“For the second category,” said Sean, “you must make it clear 
by your conduct and communications that you are willing to pay a fair 
price for a license.” 
“From that point on,” said Chase, “Sean and I need to go to 
work in crafting the best legal theories we can to create a safe harbor 
for you.” 
II. THE VIDEO ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY IS BESET WITH HIGH 
TRANSACTION COSTS FOR COPYRIGHT LICENSING 
Many songs, plays, and movies become part of the popular 
culture.  An artist like Blake, creating new material using popular 
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culture as a backdrop, often finds that the most evocative way to 
connect an audience to the context is to use a song, or to adapt a scene 
from a play or movie, or to include an established fictional character.  
The song “Happy Birthday” is an obvious example.  Who would not 
sing it at a birthday party?  If a new work concerns an iconoclastic, yet 
brave and righteous, character, would not a reference to the Lone 
Ranger or Superman be useful?  If he is cynical, might not a reference 
to Holden Caulfield from Catcher in the Rye be an efficient way to 
define the new character? 
But using these obvious techniques in the creation of a new 
work throws the artist into a briar patch of legal problems, most of 
them rooted in copyright law.  Some straightforward ways of building 
on the icons of popular culture constitute prima facie infringement of 
copyrights held by the creator of such icons.  The original copyrights 
likely have been sliced and diced so that multiple individuals and 
institutions now hold particular aspects of them.4  It is difficult to 
figure out who owns each aspect, and then to get in touch with them.5  
Once they are found, they may be unresponsive to requests for 
permissions or they may engage in strategic behavior.  The new artist 
needs all the pieces to move forward.  If he has obtained clearance to 
almost all of them, the remaining rights holders have an incentive to 
insist on a higher price to allow him to complete the package.6 
A. Copyright Blocks Unlicensed Use of Much Material Used as a 
Foundation for New Works 
Sean and Chase’s expressions of caution to Blake are well 
founded: He risks liability for copyright infringement if he uses the 
 
 4.  “In an atomistic copyright system, participants in the creative marketplace may 
have to track down and negotiate with many far-flung rights holders regarding many separate 
rights. Valuable uses of copyrighted works may therefore be prohibitively difficult or expensive.” 
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and Atomism in Copyright Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 
549, 557 (2010) (arguing that increasing the fragmentation of copyright ownership among 
multiple people owning different rights for differing periods of time undermines the purpose of 
copyright); see also Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the 
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 623-624 (1998) (explaining how 
fragmentation of property rights in a single asset can frustrate productive use of the asset); 
Kevin Werbach, The Wasteland: Anticommons, White Spaces, and the Fallacy of Spectrum, 53 
ARIZ. L. REV. 213, 230-231 (2011) (explaining how the under-consumption of a resource may 
result when too many users possess exclusive rights in the same resource). 
 5.  See discussion infra Part II.B (explaining search costs for orphan works). 
 6.  See Harold Demsetz, Transaction Cost and the Organization of Ownership—An 
Introduction, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 4 (2011) (explaining the holdout problem in property law 
generally). 
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material they identified without obtaining licenses from the owners of 
the copyrights. 
1. Basics 
Copyright extends to novels,7 plays,8 songs,9 and sound 
recordings.10  Once Blake makes his movie, he will be entitled to his 
own copyright,11 but it will not extend to any of the preexisting 
material.12  The owners of the copyrights in the novel, the play, the 
songs, and any recordings of them have the exclusive right: 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or 
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomines, and 
motion picture and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion 
picture of other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publically; and 
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of 
a digital audio transmission.13 
Unless Blake obtains licenses, the creation, distribution, and 
exhibition of his movie will infringe the derivative work, public 
distribution, performance, and display rights.14 If he streams his 
movie digitally, it will also infringe public performance rights15 for any 
sound recording. 
 
 7.  17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2006) (“literary works”). 
 8.  Id. § 102(a)(3) (“dramatic works”). 
 9.  Id. § 102(a)(2) (“musical works”). 
 10.  Id. § 102(a)(7). Songs are “musical works.” See Legal Issues Involved in the Music 
Industry, LAWYERS FOR THE CREATIVE ARTS, http://www.law-arts.org/pdf/Legal_Issues_in_the_ 
Music_Industry.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) (describing “musical works” as musical 
compositions or songs). When a song is performed, the performance is recorded, and the song is 
distributed in the form of a recording on CD or via the Internet, two distinct copyrights are 
involved, one in the musical work, the other in the sound recording. Id. (describing the two kinds 
of music copyrights). 
 11.  17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (“motion pictures and other audiovisual works”). 
 12.  Id. § 103. 
 13.  Id. § 106. 
 14.  Id. §§ 106(1)-(5) (granting copyright owners a reproduction right, a derivative work 
right, a public distribution right, a public performance right, and a public display right, 
respectively). 
 15.  Id. § 106(6) (granting copyright owners a public performance right in sound 
recordings). 
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The possibility that his conduct might be privileged by the 
doctrine of fair use, codified in § 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976,16 
depends on an after-the-fact judicial assessment of: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial 
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work 
as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.17 
While Blake is potentially liable for several instances of 
prima-facie infringement of the § 106 rights, some of his uses may 
constitute fair use. 
Two aspects of copyright protection present particular 
problems.  The first is the exclusive right to create “derivative 
works.”18  The second is the extension of protection to characters and 
plots, thus making copying of the characters or plot lines from a 
preexisting work an act of infringement.19 
2. Derivative Works 
Blake’s movie is a derivative work because it is “based on one 
or more preexisting works,” it is “a . . . motion picture version . . . 
recast[ing], transform[ing], or adapt[ing the preexisting works].”20  
The movie represents an original work of authorship by Blake,21 but 
that does not mean he has copyright privileges over all of its elements.  
The Copyright Act specifies: 
The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material 
contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material 
employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting 
material.  The copyright in such work is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge 
the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the 
preexisting material.22 
Because his incorporation of preexisting works does not change 
the copyright protection of those works, his creation of a derivative 
work from them infringes the preexisting copyrights under the 
 
 16.  Id. § 107.  
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. § 106(2). 
 19.  See discussion infra Part II.A.3. 
 20.  Id. § 101 (defining “derivative work”). 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. § 103(b). 
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derivative-work right in § 106(2).23  To the extent, however, that Blake 
used uncopyrightable expression, such as material in the public 
domain or mere facts or ideas, he does not infringe anything.24  The 
Copyright Act goes on to say, “In no case does copyright protection for 
an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, 
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, 
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, 
or embodied in such work.”25  In other words, infringement of the 
derivative-work right depends on copying of protected elements—the 
same analysis involved in a claim of infringement of the reproduction 
right.26 
3. Copyrighted Characters and Plots 
Blake initially rebuffed some of Chase’s concerns because he 
believed that characters are not copyrightable and because his 
screenwriter, Ian, had only used the play as “inspiration.”27  He did 
not understand the scope of copyright protection.  One of the most 
vexing problems in determining what elements of a preexisting work 
are protected involves characters and plots. 
Judge Learned Hand confronted the problem in Nichols v. 
Universal Pictures Corp.28  The plaintiff, author of a play named Abie’s 
Irish Rose, claimed that the defendant’s movie, The Cohens and the 
Kellys, infringed his copyright in the play.  Judge Hand observed that 
a copyrighted work, such as a play, can be “copied” at several different 
levels of abstraction.  At the lowest level, a subsequent author copies 
words, sentences, and paragraphs verbatim.  At a higher level, he may 
copy only the plot outline—the “story arc.”29  At a still higher level, the 
 
 23.  Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 223 (1990) (explaining that aspects of a derivative 
work added by the derivative author belong to that author, but that elements drawn from the 
pre-existing work remain property of the original owner). 
 24.  See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-350 (1991) (holding 
that a subsequent creator may copy uncopyrightable facts compiled by a previous creator); 
Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 916-917 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
infringement cannot be based on copying of unprotectable elements). 
 25.  Id. § 102(b). 
 26.  A video recording of a performance is a derivative work when the recording qualifies 
for copyright. Quintanilla v. Tex. Television, Inc., 139 F.3d 494, 500 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing 
example of novelist or playwright who owns derivative work right in motion picture made from 
novel or play when discussing video recording of live concert). 
 27.  See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 28.  Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 29.  See Perritt, Jr., supra note 1, at 111-121 (explaining story arc concept with reference 
to narrative theory and offering examples from the popular movie Bambi). 
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subsequent author may only make a general statement of what the 
first play was about or reproduce only its title.  Moreover,  
[T]here is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since 
otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his ‘ideas,’ to which, apart from their 
expression, his property is never extended. Nobody has ever been able to fix that 
boundary, and nobody ever can.30   
He found no infringement under this “abstractions test”: 
In the two plays at bar we think both as to incident and character, the defendant took 
no more—assuming that it took anything at all—than the law allowed.  The stories are 
quite different. . . . The only matter common to the two is a quarrel between a Jewish 
and an Irish father, the marriage of their children, the birth of grandchildren and a 
reconciliation. . . . If the defendant took so much from the plaintiff, it . . . was only a part 
of her ‘ideas.’31 
Likewise, the details of the characters were different in personality 
and background; the only copying occurred at a higher level of 
abstraction: stock characters, which are unprotectable.32 
More recent cases use Judge Hand’s abstractions test, 
reinforcing the vitality of his conceptual approach but making results 
hard to predict.  In Warner Bros. Inc. v. American Broadcasting 
Companies, Inc., the court of appeals affirmed summary judgment for 
the defendants, holding that the fictional character Ralph Hinkley, 
portrayed in a television series, was not sufficiently similar to the 
character Superman to support a claim of copyright infringement.33  
The court provided an extensive historical analysis of copyright 
protection for characters, citing many cases.34 
In determining whether a character in a second work infringes a cartoon character, 
courts have generally considered not only the visual resemblance but also the totality of 
the characters’ attributes and traits.  A pertinent consideration . . . is the extent to 
which the allegedly infringing character captures the “total concept and feel” of the 
copyrighted character. . . . “Stirring one’s memory of a copyrighted character is not the 
same as appearing to be substantially similar to that character, and only the latter is 
infringement.”35 
 
 30.  Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 (internal citations omitted). 
 31.  Id. at 121-22. 
 32.  Id. A stock character is a stereotype, with few unique characteristics to distinguish 
him or her from similar characters in other works. See Stock Character, THE INTERNATIONAL 
SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF NARRATIVE, http://narrative.georgetown.edu/wiki/index.php/Stock_ 
character (last visited Nov. 6, 2011) (providing the definition of “stock character”). Examples are 
a boyfriend with little career promise, or a young woman whose father opposes a romance. See id. 
(providing other examples, such as “the wicked stepmother”). 
 33.  Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 34.  Id. at 239-42. 
 35.  Id. at 240-242 (internal citations omitted). 
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Recent litigation uses these guidelines for protection of characters and 
the derivative-work right in the context of fan fiction.36  Two recent 
cases used Judge Hand’s abstractions test to afford copyright 
protection to fictional characters; one involved Holden Caulfield from 
Catcher in the Rye, while the second involved Harry Potter.  In 
Salinger v. Colting,37 the district court granted a preliminary 
injunction barring publication of an unauthorized sequel to Catcher in 
the Rye, finding probability of success on prima facie copyright 
infringement and unlikelihood of success on a fair use defense.  The 
accused work, 60 Years Later: Coming Through the Rye (hereinafter 
60 Years), used the principal character of Catcher in the Rye, Holden 
Caulfield, renamed as “Mr. C,” sixty years after the events portrayed 
in the original, reflecting on and repenting for some of the actions he 
took in the original novel.38 
Without extensive analysis in its written opinion, the district 
court reiterated its conclusion at an earlier hearing that the Holden 
Caulfield character was “distinctively delineated” in Catcher in the 
Rye and therefore qualified for copyright protection.39  It also found 
that an ordinary observer would conclude that the character, Mr. C in 
60 Years, was the same character as Holden Caulfield, thus satisfying 
the test for copying and therefore for prima facie infringement.40 
 
 36.  “Fan fiction” refers to a phenomenon in which persons other than the author of a 
work write their own stories about characters created by the original author, usually making no 
pretense that the characters are different. See William W. Fisher III, The Implications for Law of 
User Innovation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1417, 1420-1421 (2010) (describing the phenomenon of fan 
fiction and suggesting several different varieties); see also Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, 
Everyone's a Superhero: A Cultural Theory of “Mary Sue” Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 95 CALIF. L. 
REV. 597, 598-601 (2007); Sonia K. Katyal, Performance, Property, and the Slashing of Gender in 
Fan Fiction, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 461, 481-97 (2006); Aaron Schwabach, The 
Harry Potter Lexicon and the World of Fandom: Fan Fiction, Outsider Works, and Copyright, 70 
U. PITT. L. REV. 387, 388-91 (2009); Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and 
a New Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 651, 655 (1997). Fan fiction is an exploding 
genre, fueled by the ease with which new works by unknown authors can be disseminated on the 
Internet. Fisher, supra note 36, at 1421. “Mary Sue fiction” creates stories in which minor 
characters from earlier works star in new works or in which entirely new characters are 
inserted. Id. “Slash fiction” takes male characters from earlier works and puts them in gay 
contexts. Id. “Real person slash fiction” takes real people and puts them in stories involving gay 
relationships or encounters. Id. 
 37.  Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated, 607 F.3d 68, 75 
(2d Cir. 2010) (holding that the district court erroneously presumed irreparable injury when 
granting a preliminary injunction under eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006)). 
 38.  Id. at 253-254, 258-259. 
 39.  Id. at 254 (quoting and citing 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 2.12 (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2009)). 
 40.  Id. Upon review, the court of appeals agreed with the district court on the plaintiff's 
probability of success, while vacating the injunction. Salinger, 607 F.3d at 70. It found that the 
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The second fan fiction case, Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. v. 
RDR Books,41 involved a claim of copyright infringement by J.K. 
Rowling, the author of the Harry Potter series, against Steven Vander 
Ark and RDR Books.  Vander Ark had developed and published on the 
web a “Harry Potter Lexicon,” which provided supplementary 
information on the characters and events in the Harry Potter books. 
The district court found that the Lexicon was substantially 
similar to the copyrighted works; thus, the plaintiff had stated a 
prima facie claim of copyright infringement.42  The Lexicon included 
450 pages of new material that drew primarily from the 4,200-page 
Harry Potter series.43  Most of the Lexicon’s 2,437 entries “contain 
direct quotations or paraphrases, plot details, or summaries of scenes 
from one or more of the Harry Potter novels.”44  The defendant copied 
fictional facts invented by Rowling, “such as the attributes of 
imaginary creatures and objects, the traits and undertakings of major 
and minor characters, and the events surrounding them.”45  The court 
held that “such invented facts constitute[d] creative expression 
protected by copyright.”46 
Outside the fan fiction context, courts have had to decide how 
to address multiple elements in a given work.  As with characters and 
plots, infringement is possible only with respect to protectable 
elements.  In Sheldon Abend Revocable Trust v. Spielberg, the plaintiff 
alleged that the Stephen Spielberg movie Disturbia infringed the 
plaintiff’s copyright in the short story “Rear Window” and in the 
derivative Alfred Hitchcock film of the same name.47  Because the 
short story contained both copyrightable and uncopyrightable 
elements, the court had to focus on infringement of only the 
copyrightable elements: “[S]imilarities between unprotect[a]ble 
elements in the disputed works may not contribute to a determination 
of substantial similarity.”48  The plot of the short story and the movie 
was similar; both works tell the story of male protagonists who spy on 
their neighbor and discover the neighbor is a murderer.49  Such 
 
accused and original works were substantially similar, expressly declining to decide whether the 
plaintiff owned a valid copyright in the character, Holden Caulfield. Id. at 83 n.11. 
 41.  Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 42.  Id. at 538. 
 43.  Id. at 535. 
 44.  Id.  
 45.  Id. at 536. 
 46.  Id.  
 47.  Sheldon Abend Revocable Trust v. Spielberg, 748 F. Supp. 2d 200, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010). 
 48.  Id. at 204. 
 49.  Id. at 208. 
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similarity was not enough, however, to establish infringement, 
because only an author’s particular expression of an idea, not the idea 
itself, is copyrightable.50 
Copying characters also may constitute infringement, but only 
if the accused infringer copies specific and well-developed character 
attributes and traits.  Broad character outlines are not protectable, 
and copying them is not infringement.  The court compared the main 
characters to determine infringement: 
Hal Jeffries is a male of indeterminate age.  Kale has, at least initially, other pastimes 
to stave off boredom—television, video games, and music—while Jeffries has none.  
While Kale consistently finds himself in trouble with a police officer, Jeffries’ close 
friend is a detective.  Any similarities between Kale and Jeffries are too general to be 
afforded protection under copyright law, and when the totality of the characters’ 
attributes and traits are considered, the dissimilarities vastly outweigh the similarities, 
which are qualitatively and quantitatively insubstantial in this regard.51 
The court used the same reasoning with regard to the antagonist 
characters, explaining that the characters’ similarities “amount to 
nothing more than age, sex, and status as a personification of evil 
living next door—a basic character type—and therefore do not rise to 
the level of protect[a]ble expression of an idea.”52  “A stock character or 
basic character type . . . is not entitled to copyright protection.”53  Nor 
did the defendants infringe the setting: 
Plaintiff contends that there is substantial similarity between settings in the Short 
Story and Rear Window.  Plaintiff’s position cannot withstand scrutiny.  Disturbia is set 
in a house in suburban California while the Short Story is set in an apartment in New 
York City.  The setting of the Short Story is Jeffries’ bedroom, and more specifically, his 
chair within that bedroom and the view from that chair. In contrast, Disturbia’ s setting 
encompasses all of Kale’s house and much of his yard, as well as a shopping center, a 
parking garage, Ashley’s house and yard, a courthouse, the wilderness, a classroom, and 
Turner’s home.  Furthermore, where Jeffries’ room is impersonal—the only detail the 
author provides is that the books and sculpture in Jeffries’ room were left by a previous 
tenant—Kale’s room reflects his personality, and his house is furnished and decorated 
with personal items and photographs. Jeffries’ world, as expressed in the short story, 
consists of what he can see from his single bedroom window.  Kale, on the other hand, 
roams from room to room, utilizes windows throughout his home, and goes outside.  The 
role of the windows is similar only at a high level of generalization, and thus is not 
protect[a]ble.54 
The court found no substantial similarity to protectable aspects 
of the original story.  They were similar only at very general levels of 
abstraction, which were unprotectable.55 
 
 50.  Id.  
 51.  Id. at 209 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Hogan v. DC Comics, 48 F. Supp. 2d 298, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 54.  Sheldon, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 209-10.  
 55.  Id. at 210. 
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Applying these cases, if Blake’s movie uses exactly the same 
characters as the novel or play, the rights holders in those preexisting 
works can hold him liable for infringement.  If, on the other hand, the 
movie characters are inspired from the general types portrayed in the 
novel and play, his risk of liability is smaller.  Similarly, his exposure 
to liability for infringement of the plot and setting depends on how 
precisely he replicates either.  If he would not be liable for prima facie 
infringement, he does not need a license.  To make matters worse, the 
protectability of a movie’s plot and setting are difficult to predict, 
given the idiosyncratic factual analysis a judge or jury hearing an 
infringement case would likely use. 
B. Search Costs Are Well Known, Especially for “Orphan Works” 
Blake and his lawyer friends had little difficulty identifying the 
owner of rights in “Happy Birthday,” or establishing that the band 
Green Day owns the rights to “American Idiot.”  Obtaining licenses to 
use the elements of the play, novel, and lesser-known songs presented 
greater challenges because it was hard to figure out who owned what. 
Academic literature has recognized the problems of fractured 
ownership and orphan works.56  Professor Cardi points out the costs of 
fragmentation, discussing what he calls “under-consolidation”: 
The overwhelming expense of this process cannot be 
underestimated, even for non-Internet-related projects.   
For example, one source described the effort to clear the rights of forty-six songs for use 
in a DJ-mix album: “The process lasted three years, involving 865 emails, 160 faxes and 
hundreds of phone calls.  In the end seventy-two tracks were omitted from the album 
because the rights could not be obtained in time[.]” . . . [T]he cost of locating the 
appropriate agents and negotiating the requisite licenses is almost Sisyphean.57 
The “orphan works” problem confronts anyone wishing to 
create a derivative work, especially if the work relies on books, plays, 
music, or movies not produced by major institutions.58  A study by 
Carnegie Mellon determined that the owner of registered copyrights 
for 22 percent of books sampled could not be found, that they were 
often unresponsive to repeated requests when they could be found, 
 
 56.  See W. Jonathan Cardi, Über-Middleman: Reshaping the Broken Landscape of 
Music Copyright, 92 IOWA L. REV. 835, 838 (2007) (exploring solutions to “fractured 
administration of music copyrights,” which “discourage[s] the licensing of music for innovative 
use, stifling the success of new music technologies”). 
 57. Id. at 875-76 (internal citations omitted). 
 58.  Keith Porcaro, Note, Private Ordering and Orphan Works: Our Least Worst Hope?, 
2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 15, ¶¶ 7-8 (2010). 
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and that an average of one hundred days elapsed before an answer 
was received.59 
Courts likewise recognize the “orphan works” problem.  For 
example, in Kahle v. Gonzales, the court of appeals described the 
“orphan works” problem, even as it affirmed dismissal of the plaintiffs’ 
challenge to the constitutionality of the statute extending the 
copyright term.60  It observed that orphan works often have little or no 
commercial value, even though they remain protected by copyright.  It 
also observed that: “The difficulty and expense of obtaining permission 
to place those works on the Internet is overwhelming; ownership of 
these ‘orphan’ works is often difficult, and sometimes impossible, to 
ascertain.”61 
Prior to 1978, the number of orphaned works was limited by a 
renewal requirement that the Copyright Amendments Act of 1992 
eliminated,62 and the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act.63 
The effect of these statutes was to increase the number of orphaned 
works. 
Likewise, commentators emphasize the difficulties tracing 
copyright of an orphaned work.  As one explains: “After an author dies 
or a publisher gets acquired or goes out of business, tracing who owns 
the copyright can be nearly impossible.  Poor recordkeeping during 
publisher mergers and acquisitions can make even publishers 
unaware of which out-of-print but in-copyright books remain in their 
control.”64 
In a 2006 report,65 the US Copyright Office recommended 
legislation that would privilege good faith use of copyrighted works 
when a would-be licensee cannot locate the rights holder after a 
diligent search.66  Congress introduced such legislation in 2008, but 
did not enact it.67  The report identified four common problems facing 
would-be licensees: “(1) inadequate identifying information on a 
particular copy of the work; (2) inadequate information about 
 
 59.  Id. ¶ 15 (reporting on a Carnegie Mellon study). 
 60.  Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 61.  Id. at 698.  
 62.  Copyright Amendments Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 264 (1992). 
 63.  Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 
(1998). 
 64.  Eric M. Fraser, Antitrust and the Google Books Settlement: The Problem of 
Simultaneity, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4, ¶ 13 (2010). 
 65.  U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS (2006), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-full.pdf [hereinafter ORPHAN REPORT]. 
 66.  See Marybeth Peters, The Importance of Orphan Works Legislation, U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE (Sept. 25, 2008), http://www.copyright.gov/orphan; discussion infra Part VI.A.1. 
 67.  Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008, S. 2913, 110th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2008). 
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copyright ownership because of a change of ownership or a change in 
the circumstances of the owner; (3) limitations of existing copyright 
ownership information sources; and (4) difficulties researching 
copyright information.”68 
While it focused on printed works, the report noted that 
audiovisual works such as home videos or instructional films present 
particular difficulties.69  That category logically includes YouTube 
videos and MySpace music clips as well.  Situations in which a rights 
holder was identified, but was unresponsive, or else was insistent on a 
license fee that the would-be licensee perceived as unreasonable, were 
outside the scope of the report.70 
The legislation suggested by the report would ease Blake’s 
burden, as explained more fully in Part VI, below. 
C. Extensive Fragmentation of Copyright Aligns Poorly with the 
Realities of New Technologies 
Fragmentation of copyright ownership increases search costs.71  
One person or entity is likely to own rights in a musical work, while 
others own rights in sound recordings of the work.  In the 
hypothetical, for example, Hal Leonard owned rights to the musical 
works, but not in the sound recordings, and was not sure that its 
rights in the musical works extended to streaming. The playwright 
and the director owned different rights in the play.  Copyright owners 
may exclusively license musical works and sound recordings to one 
studio for incorporation in a movie and to another studio for 
incorporation in a television series.  Joint ventures abound, in which 
multiple persons and entities have a property interest in a project.72  
Copyright owners are likely to separate conventional broadcast rights 
from Internet streaming rights, which owners can also separate from 
Internet downloading rights.73  Similarly, owners may split off public 
performance rights from reproduction rights, which they may also 
 
 68.  ORPHAN REPORT, supra note 65, at 22. 
 69.  Id. at 25.  
 70.  Id. at 34.  
 71.  See supra note 4. 
 72.  See Ladd v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 74, 77 (Ct. App. 2010) 
(addressing a dispute over royalty allocation from a joint venture, “essentially a ‘mini-studio’ 
within a studio,” in which Ladd had control over development, production, and distribution of 
movies, while Warner was obligated to finance them). 
 73.  Cydney A. Tune & Christopher R. Lockard, Navigating the Tangled Web of 
Webcasting Royalties, 27 ENT. & SPORTS L. 20, 20 (2009) (explaining that permanent downloads, 
ringtones, CDs, podcasts, commercials, videos, and streaming implicate different licensing and 
royalty schemes). 
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divide from public distribution rights.  The fragmentation problem is 
especially acute when audiovisual works are involved.  The likelihood 
that one project has the potential to earn revenue in different 
markets—live concerts and merchandise as well as sales of recordings 
for music; DVDs, primetime and rerun exhibition on television, as well 
as original-release theatrical exhibition for movies—broadens the 
opportunity to offer many different kinds of property rights to 
collaborators and investors.74  The producer can grant first exhibition 
rights to theatrical distribution firms, while granting primetime 
television broadcast rights to television networks or cable entities and 
granting television rerun rights to someone else.  Foreign distribution 
and exhibition rights are transferred to others.  DVD rights and 
foreign distribution and exhibition rights will likely end up with still 
others.  The screenwriter may insist on derivative work rights.  A 
celebrity actor may insist on international first-release, theatrical 
exhibition rights.75 
The problems that such fragmentation cause have become 
particularly evident as new technologies change formats, methods of 
distribution, and the ways in which consumers experience 
entertainment.  For example, fragmentation frustrated early 
entrepreneurial efforts to exploit the Internet for distributing popular 
music.  In Country Road Music, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., the defendant, 
an Internet music distributor, had obtained licenses from the three 
major performing rights societies allowing it to perform musical 
compositions over the Internet.76  The licensors, however, did not 
license reproduction or distribution rights in the musical works and 
also lacked the power to license any rights in the sound recordings.77  
The district court granted summary judgment to plaintiff rights 
holders on several of their copyright infringement claims.78 
As a second example, difficulties Hulu faced obtaining 
fragmented rights to the television show If I Can Dream complicated 
its international expansion.  The show itself was owned by 19 
Entertainment, which made acquisition of the audiovisual work rights 
straightforward.  Hulu, however, had to clear rights to every recorded 
 
 74.  Cf. Anne M. Wall, Sports Marketing and the Law: Protecting Proprietary Interests in 
Sports Entertainment Events, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 77, 86, 162-63 (1996) (suggesting that 
financial returns can be increased by licensing different aspects of sports events). 
 75.  The author identifies these possibilities from his knowledge of the theatrical and 
movie industries. 
 76.  Country Road Music, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 325, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003). 
 77.  Id. at 327-28. 
 78.  Id. at 333.  
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song in the show in every territory, leading commentators to conclude 
that Hulu’s plans for international streaming could fall through.79  
Netflix’s 2009 annual report explains the problem for the video 
entertainment industry: 
Streaming content over the Internet involves the licensing of rights which are separate 
from and independent of the rights we acquire when obtaining DVD content.  Our 
ability to provide our subscribers with content they can watch instantly therefore 
depends on studios and distributors licensing us content specifically for Internet 
delivery.  The license periods and the terms and conditions of such licenses vary. . . . In 
addition, the studios have great flexibility in licensing content.  They may elect to 
license content exclusively to a particular provider or otherwise limit the types of 
services that can deliver streaming content.  For example, HBO licenses content from 
studios like Warner Bros. and the license provides HBO with the exclusive right to such 
content against other subscription services, including Netflix.  As such, Netflix cannot 
license certain Warner Bros. content for delivery to its subscribers while Warner Bros. 
may nonetheless license the same content to transactional VOD [Video on Demand] 
providers.  If we are unable to secure and maintain rights to streaming content or if we 
cannot otherwise obtain such content upon terms that are acceptable to us, our ability to 
stream movies and TV episodes to our subscribers will be adversely impacted, and our 
subscriber acquisition and retention could also be adversely impacted.80 
Exploitation of preexisting works through new technologies does not 
fit within the market structures that gave rise to the division of 
property interests when the original deals were made.  Streaming a 
movie through the Internet, for example, simultaneously constitutes 
reproduction, public distribution, and public performance.81  Older 
technologies required separation of these acts exclusively reserved to 
the copyright owner.  Reproduction of a film occurred through “print 
making,” typically performed by a movie studio.82  Public distribution 
was the province of distributors, usually entities separate from the 
studio or the theatre.  Public performance occurred only when the film 
was shown in a theatre or on television.  The theatrical exhibitors and 
television exhibitors were separate firms.83  Rights to perform each of 
 
 79.  Hulu to Start Streaming Outside the US Early 2010, WORLDTVPC.COM, (Dec. 19, 
2009, 7:14 AM), http://www.worldtvpc.com/blog/hulu-start-streaming-early-2010. 
 80.  NETFLIX, NETFLIX 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 10-11, available at http://www. 
shareholder.com/visitors/dynamicdoc/document.cfm?documentid=2789&companyid=NFLX&page
=1&pin=&language=EN&resizethree=yes&scale=100&zid=d940c238. 
 81.  Streaming involves copying the data bits that comprise the audiovisual work from 
non-volatile memory into volatile memory (reproduction), transmitting the bits to any user who 
requests the audiovisual work (public distribution), further copying of the bits to video memory 
on the hardware of the requester, and rendering of the image from the bits on the video screen of 
the requester (public performance). See generally Tracy V. Wilson, How Streaming Video and 
Audio Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS (Oct. 6, 2011), http://computer.howstuffworks.com/internet/ 
basics/streaming-video-and-audio.htm.  
 82.  HAROLD L. VOGEL, ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY ECONOMICS: A GUIDE FOR FINANCIAL 
ANALYSIS 48-51 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 6th ed. 2004). 
 83.  Id. 
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these activities were usually assigned separately.  The multiplicity of 
holders of rights to engage in what now an integrated activity gives 
rise to the type of market failure known as the anticommons.84 
Referring to this Article’s hypothetical, Blake’s peril is 
intensified by the possibility that a rights holder unknown to him or 
his lawyers might exercise the power to terminate an assignment of 
rights to him.  In Classic Media, Inc. v. Mewborn, the court of appeals, 
reversing the district court, held that the heir of a copyright owner 
could terminate an assignment of a copyright during its renewal 
term.85  The case involved the assignment of motion picture, 
television, and radio rights to the story of Lassie.86  The court held 
that one of the original author’s daughters was entitled to terminate 
the renewal copyright interests in the story, now embedded in a 
television series and about to be made into a movie.87  Authors and 
designated heirs thus are able to “negotiate additional compensation 
for previously granted rights.”88 
Some rights holders engage in rent-seeking behavior, known as 
holding out.89  If twenty different persons own the rights that a creator 
must license for a new project to proceed, each person has an incentive 
to wait until the creator makes licensing deals with most other rights 
holders, and then to insist on a premium for allowing the project to go 
forward.  Similarly, each rights holder has an incentive to wait until 
the potential licensee has invested substantial amounts of capital that 
he cannot recover without a license.  In such circumstances, the 
potential licensee is likely willing to pay a higher price for the last 
license or two, without which his project will be a failure.  This is the 
holdup problem in property markets, addressed in Part III.B, above. 
Industry organization under older technologies encouraged 
fragmentation of rights ownership.  Newer technologies require 
licenses from multiple rights holders to incorporate parts of a single 
preexisting work into one new work.  The fragmentation increases 
search costs and the likelihood of holdup. 
 
 84.  See supra note 4. 
 85.  Classic Media, Inc. v. Mewborn, 532 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 86.  Id. at 979-80. 
 87.  Id. at 986. 
 88.  Id. at 984; see also 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(A) (2006) (“A derivative work prepared 
under authority of the grant before its termination may continue to be utilized under the terms 
of the grant after its termination, but this privilege does not extend to the preparation after the 
termination of other derivative works based upon the copyrighted work covered by the 
terminated grant.”). 
 89.  See Demsetz, supra note 6. 
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D. Existing Clearance Services Are Insufficient 
Several firms offer copyright clearance services.90  ASCAP, for 
example, offers licenses for interactive and non-interactive web 
performances of songs.91  It also offers rights clearance to broadcast 
and cable television stations and cable systems.92  It does not offer 
rights clearance for moviemakers or producers of plays, however.93  
BMI similarly offers clearance to bars and restaurants, adult 
entertainment venues, local government entities, live venues, TV and 
radio stations, and websites, but not to movie or drama producers like 
Blake.94  The US Copyright Office designates SoundExchange as the 
exclusive copyright collective for satellite radio, cable TV music 
channels, and web-based streaming of sound recordings.95  It does not 
clear copyright for audiovisual works, including movies.96  The 
Copyright Clearance Center (CCC)97 is a private firm that obtains 
copyright clearance for a fee.98  It focuses on texts, but not musical, 
dramatic, or audiovisual works.99  Other firms, such as EMG, Inc.,100 
advertise that they obtain clearances for music for a negotiable fee.101  
EMG offers a web-based form for the would-be licensee and promises a 
quote for obtaining clearance.102  iCopyright103 reports that it 
 
 90.  See Letter from Steven J. Metalitz, Counsel, Smith & Metalitz LLP, to Jule L. 
Sigall, Assoc. Register for Policy & Int’l Affairs, US Copyright Office (Mar. 25, 2005), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0646-MPAA.pdf; see also Steven Marks, Orphan 
Works: Comments of The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) in Response to 
Copyright Office Notice of Inquiry (Mar. 25, 2005), http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/ 
OW0687-RIAA.pdf [hereinafter RIAA Comment]. 
 91.  License Agreements, ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/licensing/digital/reports (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2011). 
 92.  ASCAP Payment System, ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/members/payment (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2011). 
 93.  See id. 
 94.  See Get a BMI License, BMI, http://www.bmi.com/licensing (last visited Oct. 1, 
2011). 
 95.  See SOUND EXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com (last visited Oct. 1, 2011). 
 96.  See id. 
 97.  COPYRIGHT CLEARANCE CENTER, http://www.copyright.com (last visited Oct. 1, 
2011). 
 98.  About Us, COPYRIGHT CLEARANCE CENTER, http://www.copyright.com/content/cc3/ 
en/toolbar/aboutUs.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2011). 
 99.  See id. (“Copyright Clearance Center (CCC) is a global rights broker for the world's 
most sought after print and online content, from books, journals and newspapers to blogs and 
images.”). 
 100.  EMG, INC. MUSIC CLEARANCE, http://www.clearance.com (last visited Oct. 1, 2011).  
 101.  See About: Fees, EMG, INC. MUSIC CLEARANCE, http://www.clearance.com/fees.htm 
(last visited Oct. 1, 2011). 
 102.  Getting Clearance: Let Us Do It, EMG, INC. MUSIC CLEARANCE, http://www. 
clearance.com/get_letusdoit.asp (last visited Oct. 1, 2011). 
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processed four million licenses for rights to online content in 2010.104  
It, like the CCC, focuses on textual materials.105  GreenLight106 
advertises that it obtains clearances to music, film and TV.107  Its 
website provides only a simple contact form, with no details about 
pricing or the scope of its access to rights holders.108  It also advertises 
artist representation services and emphasizes its relations with major 
producers and celebrities.109  The Rights Workshop110 advertises that 
it negotiates licenses for musical compositions, film clips, photo stills, 
and online distribution.111  These firms do some of what Sean and 
Chase have offered to do for Blake, albeit with more experience and, 
presumably, established relationships with some of the rights holders.  
No equivalent of ASCAP, BMI, or Soundscan exists to clear rights for 
moviemakers. Moreover, none of the established entities is 
comprehensive in scope. All of them concentrate on one class of 
licensees, or on only one category of licensor.  The problem for Blake is 
that the existing clearance services, like the rights they would clear, 
are fragmented. 
E. The Result Is Market Failure 
These conditions create a thinned-out art; movies have less rich 
offerings of society’s previous artistic successes and thus a less 
convincing portrayal of popular culture.  Worse, some works, such as 
Blake’s movie, may not get made at all.  Either the transaction costs 
involved in trying to obtain rights consume the limited capital 
 
 103.  ICOPYRIGHT, www.icopyright.com (last visited Oct. 1, 2011). 
 104.  Four Million Copyright Licenses Fulfilled by iCopyright: New Features and Broader 
Availability Fuel Growth, ICOPYRIGHT (Oct. 18, 2010), http://info.icopyright.com/four-million-
copyright-licenses-fulfilled-by-icopyright. 
 105.  See About iCopyright, ICOPYRIGHT, http://info.icopyright.com/about-icopyright (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2011) (“As an intelligent copyright system for digital content, iCopyright helps 
publishers and independent creators protect, promote, syndicate and monetize their content—
from news and editorial articles, to blogs and independent creative works.”). 
 106.  GREENLIGHT, www.greenlightrights.com (last visited Oct. 1, 2011). 
 107.  Who We Are, GREENLIGHT, http://www.greenlightrights.com/us/index.php (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2011) (“GreenLight is a leading global consultancy, providing corporate, 
advertising, and media clients access to iconic music, film, celebrities, and entertainment 
content.”). 
 108.  Contact Us, GREENLIGHT, http://greenlightrights.com/us/contact.php (last visited 
Oct. 25, 2011). 
 109.  See id. (form); Services, GREENLIGHT, http://www.greenlightrights.com/us/services/ 
index.php (last visited Oct. 1, 2011) (description of services). 
 110.  THE RIGHTS WORKSHOP, http://www.rightsworkshop.com (last visited Oct. 1, 2011). 
 111.  Copyright Clearance, THE RIGHTS WORKSHOP, http://www.rightsworkshop.com/ 
copyright-clearance (last visited Oct. 1, 2011). 
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supporting production of these movies or the enormous endeavor 
discourages the artist from undertaking the project at all. 
The problem is exacerbated because, as James Gibson 
explains,112 ambiguities in the boundaries of copyright protection lead 
risk-averse users113 to “secur[e] copyright licenses even when none is 
needed.  Better safe than sued.”114  This overly cautious licensing 
phenomenon, he explains, tends to extend the areas of ambiguity.115  
Copyright owners point to existing licensing practices, including 
limitations they commonly impose, as proof that legal protection 
extends to the licensed use; thus extending the bounds of what uses 
require a license116 
III. THE PROBLEMS CONFRONTING VIDEO ENTERTAINMENT ARE WELL 
KNOWN IN PROPERTY MARKETS GENERALLY 
Copyright law is justified by the need to protect against a 
certain type of market failure: free riding.117  Free riding represents a 
transaction cost.  But free riding is just one transaction cost; copyright 
law, therefore, should extend to other transaction costs that might 
otherwise discourage creative effort by people like Blake. 
A. Coase on Market Failure, Externalities, and Transaction Costs 
In his 1960 article titled “The Problem of Social Cost”,118 
Ronald Coase posited that, absent transaction costs, parties will 
bargain in such a way as to lead to an efficient outcome and that legal 
entitlements are therefore unnecessary and/or irrelevant.119  The 
validity of these propositions, however, turns upon an assumption that 
 
 112.  James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 
YALE L.J. 882 (2007). 
 113.  Risk aversion is greater the more money the potential licensee has. Id. at 892-93. 
(explaining that the more money one has to lose in initial investment and expected revenue, the 
more one can bear the cost of obtaining licenses, and multi-tiered distribution leads to more 
entities seeing assurances that infringement risk is small). 
 114.  Id. at 884. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Free riding refers to the ability of someone to appropriate the creative efforts of 
another to exploit the market for the creative efforts, undercutting the price required by the 
original creator to recover his investment. See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 
971 F.2d 302, 307 n.6 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining that the purpose of copyright law is to prevent 
free-riding on another’s work). 
 118.  See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-6, 15-17 
(1960). 
 119.  Id. 
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rarely, if ever, holds true in reality: namely, an absence of transaction 
costs that may result in “market failure.”120  This section begins with a 
brief primer on Coasean economics, elaborating on these basic 
concepts. 
In Coasean economics, “costs” can take several forms and be 
classified in different ways.121  Some of the more familiar categories 
include administrative, agency, and bargaining costs (among 
others).122  Administrative costs are the costs of applying and 
enforcing legal duties.123  For example, should a copyright holder 
attempt to enforce his rights against Blake, who opposes such action 
by asserting his own privileges, administrative costs would arise, such 
as lawyer fees and litigation expenses.  Agency costs are the costs 
incurred by the principal when an agent pursues his own interests.124  
If Sean and Chase encourage Blake to engage in conduct that gives 
rise to a lawsuit because they want litigation experience rather than 
because they believe it is in Blake’s best interest, the costs imposed on 
Blake are agency costs.  Bargaining costs are the costs incurred in 
dealing and negotiating with others in order to achieve a desired 
end.125  An example would be the costs to Blake of negotiating with the 
other copyright holders in the hypothetical.  Search costs are a subset 
of bargaining costs addressed below.  They are the costs incurred in 
the pursuit of identifying the entitlement or copyright holders, the 
people with whom Blake must bargain.126  Strategic bargaining costs 
are a subset of bargaining costs that directly address holdout and 
freeloader phenomena.127  A holdout takes place when one party 
 
 120.  See Simone A. Rose, On Purple Pills, Stem Cells, and Other Market Failures: A Case 
for a Limited Compulsory Licensing Scheme for Patent Property, 48 HOW. L.J. 579 (2005). 
 121.  See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 
75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1052-61 (1997). 
 122.  Administrative costs are those generally associated with litigation or enforcement, 
while agency costs are those costs associated with hiring other people to carry out the employer’s 
various tasks. See Stephen Fraidin & Jon D. Hanson, Toward Unlocking Lockups, 103 YALE L.J. 
1739, 1834 (1994) (explaining administrative costs and agency costs in the corporation law 
context); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet 
Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (2004) (explaining administrative costs and agency costs as 
types of market failure). 
 123.  See Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 122; Lunney, supra note 122. 
 124.  John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 288, 296 n.19 (2010) (defining agency costs in the corporation law context). 
 125.  See Jonathan Dowell, Bytes and Pieces: Fragmented Copies, Licensing, and Fair Use 
in a Digital World, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 843, 856 (1998) (“Bargaining costs more obviously refer to 
the expense of negotiating with a distant party.”). 
 126.  See generally Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The Search Interest in Contract, 92 IOWA L. 
REV. 1237, 1242-51 (2007) (defining and explaining search costs). 
 127.  Id. 
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engages in “rent seeking” behavior,128 by stalling in the hopes that the 
other party will raise its offer price, usually above the market rate.  
Free-riding occurs when one party gains the benefit of an activity 
without having to pay for it, effectively forcing others to pick up the 
slack.129  The net result is underproduction of the activity.130 
B. Holdout and Free-riding Problems 
Holdout problems, a form of “strategic behavior,” occur in a 
variety of different settings.  The traditional analysis of holdout issues 
focuses on conventional real property disputes in conjunction with the 
utilization of easements between private parties.  Party A wishes to 
obtain something that she is unable to procure without the consent of 
parties B, C, and D due to a previously agreed upon easement.  Parties 
B and C consent while D “holds out” in the hopes that he can reap a 
disproportionate amount of return in excess of his own opportunity 
cost and the going market price. 
In the hypothetical, Blake faces a potential holdout problem 
with copyright issues.  Both the producer and director of the musical 
upon which Blake’s movie was based, Hit and Hide, demanded large 
shares of any potential profits derived from future revenues that 
Blake’s movie might generate.  If they made these demands solely 
based on the knowledge that Blake’s movie could not move forward 
without their approval and the amount they were requesting was 
objectively disproportionate to the value the musical added to the 
movie, they would be “holding out” in the most literal sense. 
As it relates to rights holders, Professor Mark A. Lemley notes 
that rights holders also engage in strategic behavior in the form of 
lying and concealing information.131  They play “chicken” by 
convincing their opponents that they are irrational enough to kill the 
entire deal unless they get more than their “fair” share.132 
 
 128.  In economics, rent seeking is an attempt to obtain economic rents (i.e. payments for 
the use of an economic asset in excess of the market price) through government intervention in 
the market. Paul M. Schwartz, Where Do We Go From Here? The Battle Against Predatory 
Subprime Lending, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 213, 218 n.43 (2008) (defining rent 
seeking); Rent-seeking, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rent-seeking (last updated Sept. 
27, 2011); see also Demsetz, supra note 6 (discussing holding out as an example of rent-seeking 
behavior). 
 129.  Amos. B. Elberg, Remedies for Common Interest Development Rule Violations, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1958, 1982 n.145 (2001). 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Lemley, supra note 121, at 1058. 
 132.  Id. at 1058-59. 
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Free-riding takes place in a starkly converse manner.  Instead 
of a purchaser seeking to acquire a piece of property, a freeloader 
gains the benefit of a property without having to pay for it.  The 
benefit, in essence, is undeniable to all while the cost is isolated and 
borne by a select few, especially interested members.  Suppose that 
Blake, thoroughly frustrated with the problems encountered in trying 
to seek out and negotiate with the owners of the copyrighted material, 
moves forward with the project without paying for any of the 
copyrighted material.  Blake would be free-riding off the work of 
others in order to advance his own desired ends. 
C. Collective Action Costs 
Blake’s dilemma implicates a specialized category of 
transaction costs associated with collective action.  The rights holders 
with whom Blake wants to deal might benefit from banding together 
to deal with all the Blakes in the world133 collectively.  Similarly, 
Blake might benefit from banding together with all the other Blakes 
in the world.  As the following analysis and Part IV.D.2 suggest, 
however, while collective action reduces transaction costs in other 
parts of the entertainment industry, collective action relevant to 
Blake’s needs is unlikely. 
In his 1965 book, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Good 
and the Theory of Groups, Mancur Olson challenged the notion that 
everyone in a group organized in furtherance of a common goal will 
work to achieve that goal.134  Olson theorized that individuals in a 
large group will instead “free ride”135 off the efforts of others in the 
group if the group is working to provide public goods.136  All group 
members gain when each individual does his share, but for any 
individual, the marginal cost of contributing exceeds the benefit; 
therefore, the shared responsibility is shirked by most.137  Olson 
posits: (1) A group diverse and dispersed, regardless of purpose, will 
have a difficult time organizing their collective efforts in furtherance 
 
 133.  Figuratively speaking, of course. The point is not being named “Blake.” The point is 
being an indie moviemaker needing to clear rights for material incorporated in new movies. 
 134.  MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS 16 (Harvard Univ. Press 1971) (“The [efforts of the] individual member of 
the typical large organization . . . will not have a noticeable effect on the situation of his 
organization . . . .”).  
 135.  Id. at 15-16 (“[An] individual member . . . can enjoy any improvements brought 
about by others whether or not he has worked in support of his organization.”). 
 136.  Id. at 57-58 (explaining public good concept). 
 137.  Id. at 28.   
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of their shared goals;138 and (2) “Group apathy” drastically diminishes 
in the context of a smaller, more personal setting.139 
The collective action problem exists at multiple levels with 
regard to the licensing of preexisting copyrights for moviemakers.  The 
existing system for clearance of copyright for musical works, 
exemplified by ASCAP, BMI, and SoundExchange, reduces search 
costs for licensees and also search and enforcement costs for rights 
holders.  Similar efficiencies might result from collective clearance of 
rights desired by moviemakers.  The likelihood of such collectives 
coming into existence and being sustainable, however, depends on the 
relative costs and benefits in the video entertainment market, as 
compared to the music performance market.  The effectiveness of the 
existing copyright collectives results from the large scope of their 
representation, which in turn results from the advantages they offer 
to rights holders.  Similar advantages are attenuated with respect to 
the market for video entertainment, as explained in this section below, 
and in Part IV(D). 
Economist Stanley M. Besen, in his analysis of the economics of 
copyright collectives,140 makes use of Olson’s insights to offer eight 
assumptions about the structure of the market for copyrighted songs 
and the economics of collective administration of rights: 
(1) “[I]t is less expensive for a single agent to monitor establishments on behalf of a 
large number of songwriters than it is for multiple agents, each representing a single 
songwriter, to monitor the same establishments.”141 
(2) By combining their efforts, a group of songwriters can enforce copyright better than 
individual songwriters; 
(3) Establishments value music because the performance of music increases their 
revenues from the sale of tickets, food, drink, and the like; 
(4) All songs are fungible, so that the value of music depends only on the number of 
songs played, not on the particular titles played; 
 
 138.  Id. at 29. 
 139.  See JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS § 5.5.23 
(Liberty Fund, Inc. 1999) (“It is worth noting that there are no personal elements in the 
individual's calculus of decision here, and, for this reason, the ‘free-rider’ terminology so often 
used in public-goods theory is itself somewhat misleading. The individual is caught in a dilemma 
by the nature of his situation; he has no sensation of securing benefits at the expense of others in 
any personal manner. And to the extent that all persons act similarly, no one does secure such 
benefits. Free rider, literally interpreted, more closely describes the small-number model, in 
which the individual does compete explicitly with others in a personal sense. Here, ‘let George do 
it’ means just that, with George fully identified. But the small-number model is not appropriate 
for analyzing the theory of public goods. In the relevant large-number setting, the individual 
does not really say to himself, ‘let George do it’; he simply treats others as a part of nature.”). 
 140.  Stanley M. Besen et al., An Economic Analysis of Copyright Collectives, 78 VA. L. 
REV. 383 (1992). 
 141.  Id. at 390-91. 
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(5) Users experience diminishing returns; as the number of songs available in any 
establishment increases, each additional song contributes less value to the 
establishment than previous songs; 
(6) The marginal cost of composing each song is identical; 
(7) The collective issues blanket licenses that permit all works in its catalog to be 
performed an unlimited number of times; 
(8) The collective is unregulated.142 
Blake’s situation has some important differences from the 
market context in which copyright collectives have arisen.  First, 
unlike copyrighted music being played in a bar, Blake’s use of 
copyrighted material in his movie will be fairly easy for rights holders 
to detect.  If they detect it, the large statutory damages authorized in 
the present copyright statute143 promise a much greater reward to 
rights holders than the damages they could prove under copyright 
statutes in effect in the early part of the twentieth century.144  Second, 
Blake, unlike the owner of a bar or a radio station has no particular 
need for a blanket license.  He needs licenses for only a handful of 
works.  Third, unlike a radio or television network, Blake is not likely 
to be a repeat player with respect to the same works. 
Accordingly, the benefits of a copyright collective to both Blake 
and the people with whom he needs to deal  are muted, compared with 
the contexts giving rise to ASCAP, BMI, and Sound Exchange.  
Collective action may reduce transaction costs in other parts of the 
entertainment industry, but not in an indie moviemaker’s case. 
IV. MODELS FOR SOLVING BLAKE’S PROBLEM 
A variety of models exists for reducing Blake’s transaction 
costs.  Some are embedded in the current Copyright Act.145  Others 
exist in legal regimes distinct from copyright law but confronted with 
similar types of transaction costs.  Others are purely speculative. 
A. Using Without Paying 
The optimal outcome for Blake would be not having to pay 
anything for use of the preexisting works, no matter how much of 
them he used, and no matter how essential they were to his creative 
 
 142.  Id. at 390-92 (enumerated by Author). 
 143.  See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006) (authorizing up to $30,000 in statutory damages for 
each act of infringement). 
 144.  Compare id., with Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 25, 35 Stat. 1075, 1081-82 
(current version at 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006)) (damage recovery provision). 
 145.  See discussion infra Parts IV.A.3-4, IV.B.2, IV.C., IV.D.1. 
32 VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW [Vol. 14:1:1 
 
effort.  But if Blake sees some “unused”146 acreage on Jessica’s horse 
farm, should the law privilege him to appropriate a half-acre to build a 
movie set?  He may argue that social utility would be served better by 
allowing the movie set rather than letting a small portion of Jessica’s 
land remain in grass for an occasional horse visit.  But the law of 
property does not work this way.  A crucial “stick” in the bundle of 
rights comprising property is the right to exclude.147 
No conceivable justification exists for giving Blake a blanket 
exemption from copyright law just because he is young and wants to 
make a movie.  On the other hand, Blake should be entitled to the 
same privileges available to any other creator of new works, 
interpreted to accommodate the realities of the new marketplace and 
the well-established aspects of market failure for copyright. 
1. Narrowing the Protection of Certain Elements 
Copyright does not extend to “any idea, . . . concept, [or] 
principle, . . . regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, 
illustrated, or embodied in such work.”148  That means that Blake can 
use the “ideas” and “concepts” from the play and the novel without 
infringing any copyright.  The challenge, of course, is to discover the 
line separating “ideas” and “concepts” from protected expression.  The 
cases involving protection of plots and characters, analyzed in Part 
III.A.3, show that the more that Blake uses higher-level abstractions 
of the creative elements of the play and the novel, the safer he is.  The 
more he uses specific aspects of preexisting characters and the more 
closely his story structure tracks that of the play or the novel, the 
greater his risk. 
2. Privileges Under Special Circumstances 
While the current Act recognizes some special privileges, most 
of them do not adequately address Blake’s problems.  The Orphan 
Report cited two provisos of existing law that permit use of works as to 
which a license cannot be obtained. 149  Section 108 allows libraries 
and archives to reproduce, distribute, display or perform a published 
 
 146.  Some of the works that Blake wants to incorporate into his movie are not “unused,” 
but many orphan works are. 
 147.  United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 283 (2002) (observing that the right to exclude 
is “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as 
property” (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (internal quotation 
marks omitted))). 
 148.  17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
 149.  ORPHAN REPORT, supra note 65, at 44. 
2011] FIXING FRAGMENTED COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP 33 
 
work during the last twenty years of its copyright term unless (1) it is 
being commercially exploited, (2) a copy can be obtained at a 
reasonable price, or (3) the copyright owner takes the position that 
these conditions exist.150  The effect is to “allow[] use of a work without 
permission by libraries and archives if the work is not subject to 
normal commercial exploitation and is not obtainable at a reasonable 
price.”151 
Section 114 privileges certain broadcasts and digital 
transmissions of sound recordings.152  The statutory “mechanical 
license” under § 115 allows anyone to distribute phonorecords of 
nondramatic musical works if the copyright owner has authorized 
distribution of phonorecords of that work to the public, if the statutory 
licensee notifies the copyright owner, or, if the owner cannot easily be 
located, the Copyright Office.153  The Orphan Report explains the 
privilege: 
Thus, a would-be user who is not able to locate the owner may make and distribute 
phonorecords of the orphan work according to the terms of the statutory license, 
provided he satisfies the conditions of § 115(b)(1)—and may continue to do so 
royalty-free until the owner files a registration or other record with the Copyright 
Office, at which point the work would no longer be an orphan work.154 
Neither of these provisos helps Blake.  He is not running a 
library or an archive.  He is not distributing sound recordings.  He is 
not making a phonorecord; he is making a movie.  While the current 
Act recognizes some special privileges, they do not adequately address 
Blake’s problems.  The more general fair use privilege, however, 
analyzed in the next Part, provides a limited safe harbor to Blake. 
3. Adapt the Fair Use Privilege 
Even if Blake uses protected expression, the fair use doctrine 
may privilege his conduct.155  The fair use doctrine in copyright law, 
codified in § 107 of the Copyright Act,156 saves one from liability even 
 
 150.  17 U.S.C. § 108(h). 
 151.  ORPHAN REPORT, supra note 65, at 46 (describing the effect of § 108). 
 152.  17 U.S.C. § 114. 
 153.  ORPHAN REPORT, supra note 65, at 47. 
 154.  Id. at 47-48 (describing § 115). 
 155.  The Orphan Report suggested that fair use could mitigate some of the orphan works 
problems, although it did not offer any concrete guidance. Id. at 56. The Report noted that many 
commentators expressed concern about uncertainties about the boundaries of fair use, while 
setting forth facts that “should not have given those users any pause in whether they could use 
the work,” under the fair use doctrine. Id. It also noted that uncertainties about fair use 
inhibited many owners of orphan works from pursuing infringement actions. Id. 
 156.  17 U.S.C. § 107. 
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though he has engaged in a type of conduct reserved exclusively to the 
copyright owner by § 106157 such as reproduction, preparation of a 
derivative work, public distribution, public performance, or public 
display of protected elements.158 
Analysis of the four statutory factors for fair use, consideration 
of the special position of works that have become part of popular 
culture, and market impact analysis suggest the possibility of a safe 
harbor for Blake, at least for some of the copyrighted material he has 
used. 
The doctrine requires consideration of four non-exclusive 
factors in deciding whether a particular unlicensed use of a 
copyrighted work qualifies as fair use: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial 
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work 
as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work.159 
Under the literal language of the statute and the Salinger, Warner 
Brothers, and Bouchat cases, considered in Part IV.A.3, interpreting 
the fair use privilege, a prima facie infringer who incorporates the 
entirety of a copyrighted work (factor three) that is itself commercial 
(factor two) into her own commercial work that contains little new 
expression (factor one), thereby appropriating some of the market for 
the original work (factor four) does not qualify for the fair use 
privilege.  Conversely, a law school professor who incorporates two 
sentences from a student paper (factor three), not intended for 
commercial exploitation (factor two), into a course web page (factor 
one), is likely to qualify for the privilege. 
Blake is somewhere in the middle.  Factors one and four 
strongly favor Blake’s position.  Blake’s use is transformative;160 his 
use of the preexisting material would have no material adverse effect 
on the market for the original works.  Factor two weighs against him 
 
 157.  Id. at 106. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Id. § 107. With respect to the first factor, the Supreme Court has held that the 
commercial character of a new work does not create a presumption against fair use. Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584-85 (1994) (reversing the court of appeals on the point; 
holding that the commercial character of a new work does not create a presumption against fair 
use). 
 160.  See discussion infra Part IV.A.3.a. 
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for the preexisting material that was or is being commercially 
exploited, but in his favor for the YouTube videos and music, which 
may not have been posted for commercial exploitation, especially since 
they were removed.161  Factor three weighs against him for the songs 
if he uses them in their entirety, as opposed to short excerpts.  This 
factor favors him on the play and the novel because he is using only 
certain aspects of characters and plot ideas.  Indeed, copyright may 
not protect those aspects at all.  The following sections explain these 
factors in greater depth, as applied to Blake’s case. 
a. Purpose and Character of Blake’s Use: Transformative 
Transformative works162 are more likely to constitute fair use 
under the first statutory factor, and “the more transformative the new 
work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like 
commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”163  In 
Salinger v. Colting, the court explained the rationale for privileging 
“transformative works”: 
Although a transformative use is not strictly required for the Defendant to establish the 
defense of fair use, the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally 
furthered by the creation of transformative works.  Such works thus lie at the heart of 
the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright, and 
the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, 
like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.164 
In Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. RDR Books, the court 
found the Harry Potter Lexicon to be transformative, intended for 
reference as opposed to pure entertainment purposes.165  Its lack of 
critical analysis or humor was not determinative of its status as 
transformative.166  On the other hand, the RDR Books court found 
that the defendant’s use was commercial, intended to profit from the 
entertainment value of the original works.167  In Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
 
 161.  See discussion infra Part IV.A.3.b. 
 162.  A transformative work is one that “adds something new, with a further purpose or 
different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message,” as opposed to 
merely “supersed[ing] the objects of the original creation.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569, 579. 
 163.  Id. at 579. 
 164.  Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (internal quotation 
marks omitted), vacated, 607 F.3d 68, 75 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that the district court 
erroneously presumed irreparable injury in granting a preliminary injunction under eBay, Inc. v. 
MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006)). 
 165.  Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(distinguishing book of trivia concerning Seinfeld, which was at issue in Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. 
v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
 166.  Id. at 543. 
 167.  Id. at 545. 
36 VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW [Vol. 14:1:1 
 
Amazon.com, Inc., the court of appeals found a search engine 
incorporating thumbnail images of copyrighted images was highly 
transformative because it provided considerable social benefit.168  
Likewise, in Blanch v. Koons, the court of appeals found that use of a 
photograph from a fashion magazine in a collage painting was fair use 
because of the transformative character of the painting, which used 
the image only as “fodder for his commentary on the social and 
aesthetic consequences of mass media.”169 
Another court, however, found few new and original creative 
elements in an accused work called 60 Years.  As described above, in 
Part II.A.3, the work was about the life of Catcher in the Rye character 
Holden Caulfield (called “Mr. C”) after sixty years had passed.  The 
defendants argued that the seventy-six-year-old Mr. C made much of 
the same kinds of observations and reflections as sixteen-year-old 
Holden Caulfield, “but coming from a 76 year old and applied to a 
world much changed in the 60 intervening years, such observations 
and reflections fall flat.  They reveal a character whose development 
was arrested at 16, who instead of growing up could only grow old.”170  
The court decided it was not parodic171 merely to explore the same 
characteristics of the character in a different context, one in which 
society and the characters had aged.172  “J.D. Salinger was aware of, 
and indeed emphasized, the fact that Holden’s uncompromising 
authenticity was at least partially responsible for his failure to ‘grow 
up’ and become a fully-functional adult with the capacity for mature 
relationships.”173  Even if 60 Years and Mr. C were not parodic, they 
might nevertheless be transformative if they added “something new, 
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with 
new expression, meaning, or message.”174  The court found, however, 
that the naïveté, depression, loneliness, absurdity, and inability to 
 
 168.  Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 169.  Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 170.  Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated, 607 F.3d 68 
(2d Cir. 2010) (quoting testimony). 
 171.  Further undercutting the parody argument were repeated statements by the author 
of 60 Years that it was a tribute or a sequel. Id. at 260 n.3. A parody is a paradigmatic example 
of a transformative work. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994). A parody 
is a “literary or artistic work that imitates the characteristic style of an author or a work for 
comic effect or ridicule.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Blake’s movie is not a parody of 
the preexisting works, but the analysis of parody typifies the analysis of transformative works 
more generally. 
 172.  Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 259. 
 173.  Id.  
 174.  Id. at 261 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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grow and mature depicted in 60 Years were not new; they were 
“abundant, and perhaps even central to the narrative of Catcher . . . 
.”175  Merely moving time forward by sixty years did not make the 
work transformative.176 
Similarly, in Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Ltd. Partnership, 
the court of appeals found that one use of a copyrighted logo by a 
football team was not transformative, but another was.177  The 
defendant distributed films that compiled highlights of previous 
games.178  The films included the Baltimore Raven’s Flying B logo, 
which was strikingly similar to a design submitted to the team by the 
plaintiff.179  The court held that filming the games in which the logo 
appeared added nothing new to the logo, and therefore was not 
transformative.180  The purpose of the logo was to identify the team; it 
was used for the same purpose in the allegedly infringing films.181  
The court of appeals reversed the district court’s finding of fair use of 
the logo in the films.182  Conversely, it found that use of the logo on the 
wall of the lobby of the team’s headquarters qualified as fair use 
because it was transformative and had no plausible adverse effect on 
the market for the original.183 
Blake has a strong position with respect to the transformative 
character of his movie; it is a new creative product because it uses the 
copyrighted songs only to communicate the fact of their popularity and 
to further develop the story’s characters.  “Happy Birthday” might be 
an exception, because it is so firmly embedded in the culture, as 
explained in Part IV.A.3.b.  Blake’s movie, on the other hand, is 
commercial rather than merely educational, which weakens his 
position with regard to the first factor. 
b. Nature of the Copyrighted Work: Part of the Culture 
The second factor, nature of the copyrighted work,184 provides 
room to take into account the special position of iconic works such as 
“Happy Birthday.”  Such an approach would move away from 
 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 619 F.3d 301, 308-09 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 178.  Id. at 306. 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  Id. at 308-09. 
 181.  Id. at 309. 
 182.  Id. at 317. 
 183.  Id. at 313-316. 
 184.  17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2006). 
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interpreting the second factor as disfavoring fair use for works close to 
the core of copyright’s purpose,185 and would recognize that new 
creative effort frequently borrows from the most popular existing 
works.186  Popular culture has subsumed “Happy Birthday,” and 
copyright law should not impose liability on people who sing it at a 
birthday party.187  Interpretation of copyright protection boundaries 
consistently struggles to strike the right balance between protecting 
the economic interests of the creator and leaving available a 
constantly expanding body of creative elements for exploitation by 
new creators.  The primary purpose of copyright is not to reward the 
labor of authors, but to encourage others to “build freely upon the 
ideas and information conveyed by a work.”188  Copyright does not 
prevent creators from copying elements of a previous author’s work 
that are in the public domain.189 
The performances of some works, such as “Happy Birthday” or 
the “Star Spangled Banner,” are so common that they are part of 
everyday life.  Few ordinary people would expect that either be subject 
to copyright.190  While singing either song is not transformative, thus 
undermining fair use under factor one,191 and they are usually sung in 
their entirety, undermining fair use under factor three,192 no person 
could interpret each new performance as undercutting the market for 
further performances.  No single performance will satisfy the demand. 
Judge Hand alluded to the possibility that popularity might 
broaden the privilege for use of copyrighted works in Nichols, saying, 
 
 185.  See Ben Depoorter, Fair Trespass, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1090, 1118-1119 (2011) 
(explaining that fair use is less likely under second factor for works close to the core of purpose of 
copyright, such as unpublished, creative, fictional works). 
 186.  See Arlen W. Langvardt & Tara E. Langvardt, Caught in the Copyright Rye: Freeing 
First Amendment Interests from the Constraints of the Traditional View, 2 HARV. J. SPORTS & 
ENT. L. 99, 130-131, 148-149 (2011) (arguing that fair use should accommodate the greater 
likelihood that subsequent creative works will borrow from iconic works). 
 187.  A group sing of “Happy Birthday” is a public performance, over which 17 U.S.C. § 
106(4) grants the copyright owner an exclusive right to control. Id. In any event, the second 
factor is of relatively limited importance in the decided cases. See Lital Helman & Gideon 
Parchomovsky, The Best Available Technology Standard, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1194, 1231 & 
nn.197-198 (2011). 
 188.  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991). 
 189.  Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985) 
(“[C]opyright does not prevent subsequent users from copying from a prior author’s work . . . 
materials in the public domain—as long as such use does not unfairly appropriate the author’s 
original contributions.”). 
 190.  The “Star Spangled Banner” is not subject to copyright. Even it had qualified for 
copyright protection when it was written, any copyright has long since expired. 
 191.  See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (“[T]he purpose and character of the use, including whether 
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes . . . .”). 
 192.  See id. § 107(3). 
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“If the defendant took so much from the plaintiff, it may well have 
been because her amazing success seemed to prove that this was a 
subject of enduring popularity.”193  Judge Hand focused on 
protectability of elements, but the effect of narrowing the elements 
protected is the same as broadening fair use: Either approach allows 
more room for subsequent exploitation. 
Similarly, a line of cases involving use of copyrighted computer 
software interfaces reasons that the fair use privilege should allow 
creators of new software to use as much of preexisting works as is 
necessary to participate in the marketplace.  It is well established that 
non-copyright owners can use expressions in computer interfaces if 
the expressions become industry standards, or are the only way to 
perform a function.194  Blake can argue, by analogy, that occasional 
performance of the song “Happy Birthday” is necessary for 
participation in the activities of daily living. 
The point is not that “Happy Birthday” has entered the public 
domain.  That conclusion would depend on intent by the copyright 
owner to place the work in the public domain or expiration of the 
copyright.  Rather, Blake’s argument focuses on the demand for the 
copyrighted work, asserting that when popularity crosses a high 
threshold, the fair use doctrine should permit wider use of the 
copyrighted work as part of the public discourse. 
The caselaw provides little direct support for the argument 
developed in this subsection.  When a preexisting work has become 
embedded in the culture, however, that fact should weigh in favor of 
its broader exploitation by new creators under the totality of the 
malleable fair use analysis. 
c. Amount of Copyrighted Work Taken 
The third factor, amount of copyrighted work taken, considers 
how much of the original work was used and how much was necessary 
given the purposes of the newer work.195  For example, the Colting 
court found that 60 Years copied far more from the original work than 
was necessary for parody or criticism: The newer work took much of 
the original character’s thoughts, memories, and personality traits,196 
 
 193.  Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930).  
 194.  See Tora Soft Ltd. v. Drosnin, 136 F. Supp. 2d 276, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (denying 
protection for Bible code formats because they can be displayed only in a limited number of 
ways); Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 705 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[E]lements of 
a computer program that are necessarily incidental to its function are . . . unprotectable."). 
 195.  See 17 U.S.C. § 107(3). 
 196.  See Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 263-64 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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and the supporting characters, setting, tone, and plot devices “largely 
mirror[ed]” that of Catcher in the Rye.197  Therefore, the third factor198 
weighed against fair use.  Likewise, the RDR Books court found that 
the amount and substantiality of use weighed against fair use because 
the Lexicon employed considerably more verbatim copying or direct 
paraphrasing than was necessary to provide mere references.199 
In this way, Blake’s position on factor three depends on how 
much of the preexisting works he uses.  If he uses only the basic 
character concepts from the novel and play, but provides different 
details, then his position is stronger than if he replicates them in their 
entirety.  The same is true if he uses distinctive plot points.  As to the 
musical works, he will be better off under factor three if he uses only 
portions of songs rather than reproducing the complete songs. 
d. Market-impact Element Provides Useful Flexibility 
The fourth factor considers the impact the newer work will 
have on the market for the original work.200  This factor weighed 
against fair use in Colting because 60 Years was the kind of work that 
the author of the original would be likely to create or license others to 
create as a derivative work.201  “[T]he licensing of derivatives is an 
important economic incentive to the creation of originals.”202 
On the other hand, in RDR Books the court found “no plausible 
basis to conclude that publication of the Lexicon would impair sales of 
the Harry Potter novels.”203  A closer question was presented by 
Rowling’s announced intention to produce her own reference guide, 
but the court found that “the market for reference guides to the Harry 
Potter works is not exclusively hers . . . no matter the commercial 
success attributable to the popularity of the original works.  The 
market for reference guides does not become derivative simply 
because the copyright holder seeks to produce or license one.”204  Then, 
the court held that the Lexicon would impair the market for derivative 
works for songs and poems in the Harry Potter novels even though 
 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  17 U.S.C. § 107(3). 
 199.  See Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 548-49 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008). 
 200.  17 U.S.C. § 107(4). 
 201.  Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 267; Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1112 
(9th Cir. 1998) (“A copyright owner holds the right to create sequels . . . .”). 
 202.  Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 267 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 
U.S. 569, 593 (1994)).  
 203.  Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 550. 
 204.  Id. (citation omitted). 
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there was no supporting testimony regarding Rowling’s intention to 
exploit that market.205 
Blake’s position under factor four thus depends on the answers 
to the following question: Does the distribution and exhibition of his 
movie cannibalize the market for the other works, or does it enhance 
them, as audiences for his movie seek out the original works included 
in the movie?  Placing the new work in a different market may 
appropriate the original creator’s hope to penetrate new markets, but 
if the original creator is not active in those new markets, and has 
taken no concrete steps to enter the new markets, the harm is less 
direct.  The fourth fair use factor provides authority to consider the 
relationship between the activities of the original creator and the new 
creator.  If the original creator is unlikely to exploit the market the 
new creator targeted, the fourth factor weighs in favor of fair use.206 
It is preposterous to conclude that Blake’s use of the song 
“Happy Birthday” will diminish the market for the song.  To reach this 
absurd result would require a factual conclusion that his use of the 
song in his movie will make people less likely to sing “Happy 
Birthday.”  Likewise, unless he has bodily appropriated207 the 
characters from the play or the novel in his movie, the likelihood that 
his movie will diminish the markets that the rights holders might 
plausibly exploit is small. 
Fair use law would treat an outright refusal by the copyright 
owner to license on any terms as foreswearing use in commerce, 
signifying that there is no market to adversely affect.  In addition, a 
refusal to license, depending on other facts, could be part of an effort 
to protect a monopoly position in one market by forestalling new entry 
into adjacent markets or markets for substitute productions.  
Monopoly protection reinforces the pro-competition theme of the 
copyright misuse doctrine, analyzed in the next subsection. 
 
 205.  Id. at 551. 
 206.  See generally Matthew Sag, Copyright and Copy Reliant Technology, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1607, 1654 (2009) (noting that the unlikelihood of a derivative market being exploited by an 
original creator weighs in favor of fair user under fourth factor). 
 207.  The term “bodily appropriation” is often used in the copyright infringement context 
to refer to the wholesale copying of a preexisting work. See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 28 (2003) (using the term in context of trademark 
infringement); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (using 
the term in copyright infringement case); BUC Int’l Corp. v. Int’l Yacht Council Ltd., 489 F.3d 
1129, 1150 n.44 (11th Cir. 2007) (using the term in copyright case (quoting MiTek Holdings, Inc. 
v. Arce Eng’g Co., Inc., 89 F.3d 1548, 1558-59 (11th Cir. 1996))). 
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4. Copyright Misuse 
The copyright misuse doctrine might offer Blake some 
protection from copyright owners who hide or who insist on exorbitant 
license fees.  Copyright misuse is an equitable “unclean-hands 
defense” to copyright infringement.208  A finding of misuse does not 
extinguish the copyright; it merely bars relief for infringement in the 
context of the misuse.209 
In Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment, 
Inc., the court of appeals discussed the misuse defense, observing that 
it is especially appropriate when a rights holder uses its copyright to 
limit competition, but more broadly to any leveraging of the copyright 
to “restrain the creative expression of another.”210  The court found 
that restrictions on expression critical of Disney in Disney’s licensing 
agreements did not rise to the level of misuse.211  It distinguished 
Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc.,212 as applying the 
misuse defense to deny Howard Hughes’s effort to obtain an injunction 
against publication of a forthcoming biography.213  Howard Hughes 
sought to use copyright law solely to block expression; Disney had 
mixed motives, and the alleged infringer had other channels to 
communicate its criticism of Disney.214 
On the other hand, in Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Technologies, 
Inc., the court found copyright misuse, barring an injunction against 
infringement.  It explained that “[a] reasonable juror could conclude, 
based on the licensing agreement, that DSC has used its copyrights [in 
operating system software] to indirectly gain commercial control over 
products DSC does not have copyrighted, namely, its microprocessor 
cards.”215 
Other cases provide additional examples of copyright misuse as 
a defense.  For example, in Practice Management Information Corp. v. 
American Medical Association, the court of appeals held that the AMA 
 
 208.  Altera Corp. v. Clear Logic, Inc. 424 F.3d 1079, 1090 (9th Cir. 2005) (rejecting 
independent claim for misuse because no allegation of infringement). 
 209.  See Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 793 n.81 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(quoting Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 979 n.22 (4th Cir. 1990)). 
 210.  Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 205 (3d Cir. 
2003). 
 211.  See id. at 206 (finding that alternative channels for criticism of Disney existed and 
that fair use might privilege criticism by licensees regardless of license restrictions). 
 212.  Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966). 
 213.  Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 205-06. 
 214.  See id. 
 215.  See Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 793 (5th Cir. 1999) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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committed copyright misuse when it conditioned a copyright license on 
nonuse of competing coding systems.216  In Lasercomb America, Inc. v. 
Reynolds, the Fourth Circuit, in one of the earliest cases to accept the 
misuse defense, held that the defense is available “even if the 
defendants themselves have not been injured by the misuse.”217 
Finally, in Shloss v. Sweeney, the district court recognized the 
possibility of misuse in the context of a motion to strike or to dismiss 
the complaint, explaining: 
Plaintiff undertook to write a scholarly work on Lucia Joyce—the type of creativity that 
the copyright laws exist to facilitate.  Defendants’ alleged actions significantly 
undermined the copyright policy of “promoting invention and creative expression,” as 
Plaintiff was allegedly intimidated from using (1) non-copyrightable fact works such as 
medical records and (2) works to which Defendants did not own or control copyrights, 
such as letters written by third parties.  The Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently 
alleged a nexus between Defendants’ actions and the Copyright Act’s public policy of 
promoting creative expression to support a cause of action for copyright misuse.  218 
As these cases demonstrate, most of the copyright misuse 
caselaw suggests that misuse occurs only when a rights holder 
overreaches to extend his statutory monopoly so as to interfere with 
competition in a market other than the one in which the copyright 
exists.  Blake will argue that rights holders, by refusing to license on 
fair terms, are using their copyright to restrict competition in a 
different market—the market for his movie.  He will argue that such 
behavior is misuse because it undermines the goal of the Copyrights 
and Patents Clause to reward creators while allowing others to build 
on their efforts.219 
5. Nuisance 
Even though nuisance has no direct role to play in addressing 
Blake’s copyright clearance problems,220 certain aspects of nuisance 
doctrine provide useful analogies.  Nuisance law imposes liability on 
 
 216.  Practice Mgmt. Adver. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 520-21 (9th Cir. 
1997). 
 217.  Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 979 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 218.  Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1080-81 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
 219.  See generally Kathryn Judge, Rethinking Copyright Misuse, 57 STAN. L. REV. 901, 
928-29 (2004) (evaluating proposals that misuse defense should be available to protect against 
efforts to discourage fair use). 
 220.  Nuisance historically has been applied only to real property—when both the 
plaintiff and the defendant are asserting interests associated with parcels of real property. See, 
e.g., Hendricks v. Stalnaker, 380 S.E.2d 198, 202-03 (W. Va. 1989) (balancing competing 
interests of owners of neighboring property, one of whom was unable to install a septic tank 
because the other had drilled a well too close to the property line). Blake and the rights holders 
are not asserting interests associated with real property. Movies, songs, plays, and novels are 
intangible personal property. 
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one property owner who uses his property so as to withhold support 
for another piece of property—in the physical sense.  Undermining 
lateral or subjacent support is a nuisance.221  Conceptually, this 
provides a rough analogy to Blake’s dilemma; the rights holders are 
refusing to allow Blake to use their property to provide essential 
support for Blake’s artistic endeavor. 
Just as a withdrawal of lateral or subjacent support is 
enjoinable as a nuisance, a refusal to grant a license to Blake would be 
indirectly enjoinable, because Blake depends on the support provided 
by the preexisting works. 
B. Finding Someone to Receive Payment 
As the preceding sections explain, the scope of privilege to use 
preexisting works without paying is limited.  It extends to abstracted 
use of characters and plot points, and might be stretched to include 
artistically justifiable use of works that are inseparable from popular 
culture.  Under existing law, it does not extend to appropriation of 
entire songs that are not culturally iconic—the YouTube music videos, 
and the song by Green Day.  For these, Blake will have to pay.  His 
willingness to pay, however, does not solve the problem; he has to find 
someone to pay, someone who has the power to agree to a license.  As 
the story indicates, this may not be easy.  The law mitigates search 
costs in a variety of ways, usually through some kind of recording 
system for property interests.  These systems serve purposes in 
addition to reduction of search costs. 
1. Traditional Recording Systems 
Traditional title recording systems are intended to regularize 
the establishment of priority when conflicting claims to the same piece 
of property exist.222  One who records a transfer gives “record notice” 
to those who may receive interests in the same property later, thus 
subordinating the interest of the later-in-time transferee.223  The 
systems have the collateral benefit of reducing search costs for those 
 
 221.  See, e.g., Cecola v. Ruley, 12 S.W.3d 848, 854 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (stating general 
principle in action for partition); Jones v. Pa. R.R., 75 S.E.2d 103, 106 (W. Va. 1953) (recognizing 
that diversion of stream thereby undercutting subjacent or lateral support for plaintiff's land 
constituted a nuisance, but remanding for a new trial of evidence of damages). An example of 
undermining lateral or subjacent support would be an adjoining property owner excavating her 
property so as to cause the adjacent property to cave in. 
 222.  See Lobato v. Taylor, 70 P.3d 1152, 1172-73 (Colo. 2003) (explaining purpose and 
functioning of land title registration systems). 
 223.  Id. 
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who want to ascertain who owns a piece of property, for example, in 
order to obtain an express easement across it.  Without title 
registration, one who wishes to ascertain ownership would have to 
embark on an impracticable survey of the universe of possible 
property owners, with little likelihood of useful response. 
A similar system is available for recording security interests in 
personal property under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC).224  The holder of a security interest who fails to record loses his 
secured lien in the personal property vis-à-vis other creditors with a 
claim to the same property.225 
2. Copyright Recording System 
The Copyright Act also provides for a recording system through 
its registration option. Registration of a copyright is required, 
however, only as a prerequisite to suing for infringement,226 and not 
for establishment of copyright.227  The functioning of that requirement 
leaves a potential infringer vulnerable to liability because the 
registration database may provide no information as to those claiming 
copyright until infringement has occurred and a suit has been filed. 
More concrete legal effects result from failure to register 
copyright transfers.  The Copyright Act contains a Statute of Frauds 
that makes “transfers of copyright ownership” invalid unless the 
transfer is made in, or evidenced by, a writing signed by the 
transferor.228  The statute also has a race-notice section, which gives 
priority to subsequent transferees for consideration and without notice 
as to who recorded first.229  As with most recording statutes, recording 
gives constructive notice if it specifically identifies the work to which 
it pertains so that a reasonable search under the title or registration 
number of the work would find it230 and indicate the work was 
registered.231  Therefore, the transferee of a copyright is vulnerable if 
 
 224.  See generally U.C.C. § 9 (2011). 
 225.  MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 9-310(a) (West 2011) (filing ordinarily required to 
perfect security interest); id. § 9-315(a) (perfected security interest has priority over interests of 
transferees). 
 226.  17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006). 
 227.  Id. § 408(a). 
 228.  Id. § 204(a). 
 229.  Id. § 205(d). 
 230.  Id. § 205(c). 
 231.  Id.; In re World Auxiliary Power Co., 303 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining 
that recording a security interest in unregistered copyright would not give constructive notice 
under § 205 and thus does not preserve creditor's priority). “There just isn't any way for a 
secured creditor to preserve a priority in an unregistered copyright by recording anything in the 
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his transferor subsequently transfers the same interest to another 
person.  If the subsequent transferee lacks knowledge of the first 
transfer and records first, the statute extinguishes the first 
transferee’s interest in favor of the second transferee.232  This creates 
a powerful incentive for any transferee to immediately record the 
transfer and make sure the work is registered.  Specifically, the Act 
says: 
A nonexclusive license, whether recorded or not, prevails over a conflicting transfer of 
copyright ownership if the license is evidenced by a written instrument signed by the 
owner of the rights licensed or such owner’s duly authorized agent, and if— 
(1) the license was taken before execution of the transfer; or 
(2) the license was taken in good faith before recordation of the transfer and without 
notice of it.233 
The Act does not distinguish between an assignment of the entire 
copyright and an exclusive license for only one of the rights.234  Thus, 
priority of the assignee of a partial interest depends on recording. 
The Copyright Act only provides priority for registered 
copyrights, although the Act contemplates that most owners will not 
register their copyrights.  The owner of a security interest in an 
unregistered copyright can give constructive notice and preserve the 
creditor’s priority only by recording under UCC Article 9.235 
These recording systems offer Blake some protection against 
transferees of rights who have not recorded the transfers.  Blake will 
not be protected, however, against the original copyright owner who 
does not record until just before he sues Blake. 
3. Quiet Title Actions 
Quiet title actions are in rem proceedings that clarify rights in 
property.  For example, a Georgia quiet title action statute provides: 
Any person . . . who claims an estate of freehold present or future or any estate for years 
of which at least five years are unexpired . . . may bring a proceeding in rem against all 
 
Copyright Office. And the secured party can't get around this problem by registering the 
copyright, because the secured party isn't the owner of the copyright, and the Copyright Act 
states that only ‘the owner of copyright may obtain registration of the copyright claim.’” World 
Auxiliary, 303 F.3d at 1126. 
 232.  See Tuff-N-Rumble Mgmt., Inc. v. Sugarhill Music Publ’g Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 673, 
681 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that subsequent assignee of copyright rights had priority over 
earlier assignee because earlier assignee failed to prove either actual notice of the prior transfer 
or earlier recordation). 
 233.  17 U.S.C. § 205(e). 
 234.  Peer Int’l Corp. v. Latin Am. Music Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 38, 49 (D.P.R. 2001) 
(resolving priority in favor of prior transferee). 
 235.  World Auxiliary, 303 F.3d at 1128, 1131. 
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the world to establish his title to the land and to determine all adverse claims thereto or 
to remove any particular cloud or clouds upon his title to the land, . . . which proceeding 
may be against all persons known or unknown who claim or might claim adversely to 
him, whether or not the petition discloses any known or possible claimants.236 
The quoted Georgia statute, by its terms, only applies to real 
property and requires that the plaintiff hold an ownership interest.  
The California statute, on the other hand, extends the scope of quiet 
title actions to personal property.237  Only one with legal title to 
disputed property may bring an action, however.238 
Assuming Blake lives in a state with a statute like California’s, 
Blake could not maintain a state quiet title action.  Even if state 
actions like this were available to him, Blake does not have legal title 
to the copyrights.  Furthermore, state quiet title actions involving 
copyright claims are actually not available to him; they are completely 
preempted by federal law.239  Nevertheless, federal courts entertain 
quiet title claims in copyright disputes.240  A court may entertain a 
suit essentially to quiet title as a copyright injunction action.  In 
Archie Comic Publications, Inc. v. DeCarlo, the court characterized an 
action by the publisher of Archie comic books against the estate of an 
artist as one in which the plaintiff “seeks declaratory and injunctive 
relief, essentially to quiet its title to these properties against recent 
claims by DeCarlo’s estate.”241  It held that the plaintiff was entitled to 
an injunction barring the defendant from suing or threatening to sue 
the plaintiff or its licensees with respect to the works at issue.242  The 
Copyright Act also provides for an incomplete form of quiet title action 
by requiring joinder and allowing the intervention of all persons with 
a recorded interest in the copyright whenever a suit for infringement 
is filed.243 
Blake might also be able to obtain injunctive relief, akin to 
quieting title against multiple rights holders at once.  Joinder of 
competing claimants as defendants under the Federal Rules of Civil 
 
 236.  GA. CODE ANN. § 23-3-61 (2011). 
 237.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 760.020(a) (West 2011) (“An action may be brought under 
this chapter to establish title against adverse claims to real or personal property . . . .”). 
 238.  Lewis v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 63, 74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that 
the holder of equitable title may not maintain quiet title action against the legal owner). 
 239.  Pebble Creek Homes, LLC v. Upstream Images, LLC, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1217 
(D. Utah 2007) (finding removal jurisdiction over quiet title action on complete preemption 
grounds). 
 240.  See Archie Comic Publ’ns, Inc. v. DeCarlo, 258 F. Supp. 2d 315, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(summarizing relief in quiet title action). 
 241.  Id. at 317. 
 242.  Id. at 335. 
 243.  17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2006). 
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Procedure would satisfy the requirement that, as to all the 
defendants, “any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, 
severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the 
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 
occurrences.”244 
Nevertheless, quiet title and interpleader actions245 depend on 
the plaintiff having a preexisting interest in the property in dispute.  
Absent statutory amendment, it is difficult to identify a right Blake 
could assert.  Any rights Blake has in his derivative work do not 
extend to the preexisting material, as explained in Part II.A.2.  The 
Copyright Act gives him, at most, a privilege to use the material, not 
rights in it.  On the other hand, if claims of infringement by rights 
holders in preexisting works have crystallized to the point of cease and 
desist demand letters or refusals to engage in good faith negotiations 
over reasonable license terms, the case might be ripe for a declaratory 
judgment action, which might be maintained as a defendant class 
action. 
C. Determining a Fair Payment 
Blake’s transaction costs go beyond those associated with 
orphan works.  They also include the possibility of holdout, explored in 
Part III.B.  Addressing Blake’s problem comprehensively requires 
some mechanism to set fair royalty rates when the parties cannot 
agree on their own.  Because government price-setting in a market 
economy is relatively rare, the models offered in this section are only 
suggestive as to procedures and criteria for a fair price. Only the 
compulsory license schemes in the present Copyright Act could be 
directly adapted to address Blake’s problem.  As written, however, 
they are far too narrow in scope to apply to Blake and the rights 
holders from whom he wants licenses. 
This section begins with eminent domain because that doctrine 
is the oldest and best known legal mechanism for transferring 
property interests and setting a fair price for the transfer.  The 
Takings Clause, as well as the Supremacy Clause, limits state use of 
eminent domain.246  State eminent domain has no application in the 
copyright field because of preemption.  There is no reason however, 
 
 244.  FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2)(A). 
 245.  See discussion infra Part IV.D. 
 246.  See U.S. CONST. amend. V (Takings Clause); U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy 
Clause).  
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why Congress could not enact a regulatory scheme functionally 
equivalent to eminent domain in the copyright field. 
1. Eminent Domain 
Virtually every state and the federal government exercise the 
power of eminent domain: taking private property for a public 
purpose.247  The historical underpinnings of eminent domain run back 
to the idea that all property emanates from the sovereign.248  What the 
sovereign gives, the sovereign can take away. 
Typically, when a governmental body with eminent domain 
power decides to condemn property, it commences a legal 
proceeding.249  The property owner is entitled to a jury determination 
of the reasonable value of the property, which must be paid to the 
property owner.250  The court hearing the condemnation action decides 
if the power to exercise eminent domain exists in the particular 
case.251  Usually, this involves a determination of whether a statutory 
public use requirement or its Constitutional equivalent has been 
satisfied. 
a. Public Use Requirement 
The source of the public use requirement is the Fifth 
Amendment to the US Constitution.252  By its terms, it applies only to 
federal condemnation; it applies to the states because it is 
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment.253 This Article 
considers private condemnation under the state statutes in Part 
IV.C.1 below. 
In Cohen v. Larson, the Supreme Court of Idaho rejected a 
private condemnation action brought to benefit owners of lakeside 
 
 247.  See D. Zachary Hudson, Eminent Domain Due Process, 119 YALE L.J. 1280, 
1293-1301 (2010) (reviewing briefly the history of eminent domain in the United States). 
 248.  A.W.B. Simpson, Constitutionalizing the Right of Property: The U.S., England and 
Europe, 31 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 4 (2008) (tracing concept back to Grotius and Chancellor Kent). 
 249.  See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 30/5-5-5 (LexisNexis 2011) (disallowing eminent 
domain power unless for public use); id. § 10-5-10(a) (explaining that eminent domain action 
commenced by filing a complaint in the circuit court); id. § 10-5-5 (stating that just compensation 
to be determined by jury). 
 250.  See supra note 249. 
 251.  See supra note 249. 
 252.  See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 469 (2005) (applying public use 
requirement of Fifth Amendment to US Constitution). 
 253.  See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 
2592, 2601 (2010) (applying the Takings Clause to state action). 
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lots.254  It held that a private condemnation action can succeed only if 
it involves some public benefit.255  The court also held that some forms 
of private condemnation, such as condemnation to secure a place for 
storage of harvested timber, sufficiently benefited the public.256 
b. Private Condemnation 
Some states authorize private condemnation.  Arizona, for 
example, permits a landlocked private landowner to condemn a 
“private way of necessity” across lands of another upon a showing of 
“reasonable necessity.”257  The US Supreme Court has referred to 
private eminent domain statutes in the western states approvingly, 
suggesting that they might be a useful replacement for the common 
law easement-by-necessity doctrine.258  An Arizona case denying 
condemnation illustrates the controversies likely under such statutes: 
A battle such as this involves a clash of values.  The Arizona Constitution provides for 
condemnation of a private way of necessity as a means to prevent bottling up and 
rendering ineffective a portion of the resources of the state.  Yet Defendants’ right to 
preserve and protect their private property is also constitutional and should not be 
lightly regarded or swept away.259 
Similarly, Washington allows any landowner to condemn a way of 
necessity upon a showing that it is necessary for the land’s “proper use 
and enjoyment.”260 
Such statutes may be unconstitutional because they do not 
involve public uses.261  Defenders argue that they are no more than 
codifications of the common law easement-by-necessity doctrine.262  
Some have been struck down.263  Others have been upheld, based on 
 
 254.  Cohen v. Larson, 867 P.2d 956, 958 (Idaho 1993). 
 255.  Id. 
 256.  Id. at 959. 
 257.  Siemsen v. Davis, 998 P.2d 1084, 1084 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
§ 12-1202 (LexisNexis 2011)). 
 258.  Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 680 n.16 (1979) (rejecting the need for 
easement by necessity in the government). 
 259.  Siemsen, 998 P.2d at 1088 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (affirming denial of condemnation because plaintiffs did not meet burden of 
showing reasonable necessity). 
 260.  Ruvalcaba v. Kwang Ho Baek, 247 P.3d 1, 1 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (citing WASH. 
REV. CODE § 8.24.010 (2011)) (holding that a landowner voluntarily landlocking his parcel 
without reserving an easement is entitled to the benefits of the statute). 
 261.  See infra notes 262-265. 
 262.  In re Opening Private Road for Benefit of O'Reilly, 5 A.3d 246, 256 (Pa. 2010) 
(describing argument by appellees). 
 263.  See Tolksdorf v. Griffith, 626 N.W.2d 163, 163 (Mich. 2001) (holding Private Roads 
Act unconstitutional because it served no public purpose). 
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indirect benefits to the public from freeing up landlocked land.264  In 
any event, careful scrutiny of the evidence of public benefits is 
required.265 
c. Application to Entertainment and Intellectual Property 
Occasionally, owners of intellectual property argue that 
governmental interference constitutes a Fifth Amendment taking.  In 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., the Supreme Court held that compelled 
disclosure of trade secrets might constitute a taking.266  Nevertheless, 
the Court rejected the argument that compelling the disclosure of 
trade secrets to reduce the research and development costs of 
subsequent applicants for pesticide approval violated the public use 
requirement.267 
On the other hand, in Zoltek Corp. v. United States, the Federal 
Circuit, relying on the Supreme Court’s 1894 decision in Schillinger v. 
United States, held that the sole remedy for governmental 
infringement of a patent is a claim under the Tucker Act, rejecting the 
district court’s acceptance of a takings argument.268 
In a broader context, the government has exercised its power to 
reallocate private property in the entertainment field.  It does so, for 
example, when it uses eminent domain to construct sports facilities.269  
Typically, the public use of the proposed facilities, such as stadiums 
and arenas for professional athletic teams, is more obvious and 
includes a broader segment of the public benefits than reallocation of 
property interests in order to allow a private person to make a movie. 
A 2007 student note by Ian McClure argues that the exercise of 
eminent domain over copyrights is entirely plausible.270  The author 
 
 264.  Cf. County of Hawaii v. C & J Coupe Family Ltd. P’ship, 242 P.3d 1136, 1136 (Haw. 
2010) (citing Tolksdorf, 626 N.W.2d at 163) (finding condemnation of private road by county 
constitutional). 
 265.  O'Reilly, 5 A.3d at 246 (citing Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 469 (2005)); 
Tolksdorf, 626 N.W.2d at 163 (remanding for determination of whether exercise of authority 
under Private Road Acts was constitutional based on assessment of public benefit). 
 266.  Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1020 (1984) (holding that any taking 
can be compensated under the Tucker Act). 
 267.  Id. at 1014. 
 268.  Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2006). See generally 
Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163 (1894). 
 269.  See Tyson E. Hubbard, For the Public’s Use? Eminent Domain in Stadium 
Construction, 15 SPORTS LAW. J. 173, 173 (2008) (reviewing caselaw on the use of eminent 
domain power to construct sports facilities). 
 270.  Ian McClure, Comment, Be Careful What You Wish For: Copyright's Campaign for 
Property Rights and an Eminent Consequence of Intellectual Monopoly, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 789, 
815-16 (2007). 
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explains how the public purpose requirement could be met with 
respect to certain copyrights and patents: 
Surely, if breaking up a land oligopoly serves a public purpose, constituting a valid 
taking of land, so could breaking up a media oligopoly, constituting a “valid” taking of 
copyrights. . . [A] state might implement legislation calling for compulsory licensing of 
copyrights for just compensation.  In this way, the government will force the transfer of 
certain rights to the use and sale of a copyrighted product from one private party to 
another, or many others.  The price, just compensation, will be paid by the government. . 
. . The result will be increased competition, increased output, and decreased prices to 
the public . . . .  In the context of eminent domain as applied to copyright, the benefit 
could be deemed public because of the facilitation of public access to information.271 
The public use arguments and McClure’s proposal are of little 
immediate benefit to Blake, unless a state were to exercise its eminent 
domain power for his benefit, which is quite unlikely.  Nevertheless, 
the arguments in the eminent domain context buttress the credibility 
of other approaches discussed in the next section to mitigate Blake’s 
transaction costs. 
2. Other Mechanisms for Reducing Holdout Costs: Statutory 
Compulsory License Mechanisms 
The Copyright Act establishes compulsory licenses in a variety 
of circumstances,272 providing mechanisms for adjudicating fair 
licensing fees.  None of them are currently applicable to Blake’s 
situation, but they represent models that could extend to him. 
The broadest and best-established compulsory license is the 
“mechanical license” under § 115.273  The D.C. Circuit summarized the 
mechanical license in RIAA v. Librarian of Congress.274  Under the 
statute, whenever the owner of a copyright in a nondramatic musical 
work distributes recordings to the public, any other person is entitled 
to a compulsory license to make his own recordings and distribute 
them to the public.275  Persons availing themselves of this statutory 
privilege must pay the rights holder a royalty,276 either negotiated277 
 
 271.  Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 272.  17 U.S.C. § 111 (2006) (establishing license for secondary transmissions of broadcast 
programming by cable networks); id. § 112 (establishing license for broadcaster to make one 
recording); id. § 114 (establishing license for digital audio transmission of sound recordings); id. § 
115 (establishing license for recordings of musical works); id. § 116 (establishing license for 
jukeboxes); id. § 118 (2006) (establishing license for public broadcasters); id. § 119 (establishing 
license for secondary transmissions by satellite carriers). 
 273.  Id. § 115. 
 274.  Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Librarian of Cong., 608 F.3d 861, 863-64 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010). 
 275.  17 U.S.C. § 115. 
 276.  Id. § 115(c)(2). 
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or set by an administrative agency called the Copyright Royalty 
Board, which comprises three Copyright Royalty Judges appointed by 
the Librarian of Congress.278 
Royalties by the Board must be set to achieve the following 
objectives: 
(A) To maximize the availability of creative works to the public. 
(B) To afford the copyright owner a fair return for his or her creative work and the 
copyright user a fair income under existing economic conditions. 
(C) To reflect the relative roles of the copyright owner and the copyright user in the 
product made available to the public with respect to relative creative contribution, 
technological contribution, capital investment, cost, risk, and contribution to the 
opening of new markets for creative expression and media for their communication. 
(D) To minimize any disruptive impact on the structure of the industries involved and 
on generally prevailing industry practices.279 
The mechanical license was enacted by the Congress in reaction to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. 
Apollo Co., holding that player-piano rolls280 were not copies of 
musical works, thus allowing the defendant to play plaintiff’s songs 
without a license fee or fear of an infringement suit.281  The Court 
expressed concern that a contrary interpretation of the Copyright Act 
would make “cylinder(s) of a music box . . . or the record(s) of the 
graphophone” infringing.282 
After extensive hearings, Congress balanced the demands: 
those of the music publishers for extending the reproduction right to 
recorded music, and those of recording device manufacturers for 
access to published music. The result was the enactment of the 
 
 277.  Id. § 115(c)(3)(E). The statute provides an exemption from the antitrust laws for 
collective negotiations of royalties. Id. § 115(c)(3)(B). 
 278.  Id. § 115(c)(3)(D) (binding effect of royalties established by judges); Recording Indus. 
Ass’n of Am., 608 F.3d at 863-64 (explaining role of Board). The history of royalty-setting 
mechanisms for compulsory licenses is detailed in the preamble to the procedural regulations for 
the Board. Procedural Regulations for the Copyright Royalty Board, 70 Fed. Reg. 30901 (May 31, 
2005) (codified at 37 C.F.R. chap. III). 
 279.  17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1); see Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 608 F.3d at 864 
(summarizing and characterizing factors). 
 280.  White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1908) (“[P]ersons 
skilled in the art can take such pieces of sheet music in staff notation, and, by means of the 
proper instruments, make drawings indicating the perforations, which are afterwards outlined 
and cut upon the rolls in such wise as to reproduce, with the aid of the other mechanism, the 
music which is recorded in the copyrighted sheets.”).  
 281.  Id. at 17. 
 282.  Id. 
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mechanical license provisions now codified in 17 U.S.C. § 115.283  
Congress was influenced by claims that extending the reproduction 
right to sound recordings would enable monopolies because of the 
incentive for one record provider to obtain rights to a majority of 
popular songs.284  As a result, it provided that a copyright owner 
retained the power to license or not license a musical work.285  Once he 
licensed it, however, all others were entitled to a license on the same 
terms.286  The music publishers established the Harry Fox Agency to 
administer mechanical licenses on behalf of copyright owners.287  The 
statute obligated a copyright owner to notify the Copyright Office as 
soon as he had licensed a work for mechanical reproduction.288  Then 
anyone wishing to avail himself of the compulsory license was 
obligated to file a notice of intent with the copyright owner and with 
the Copyright Office.289  The Register of Copyrights, testifying in 2005, 
characterized § 115 this way: 
At its inception, the compulsory license facilitated the availability of music to the 
listening public.  However, the evolution of technology and business practices has eroded 
the effectiveness of this provision.  Despite several attempts to amend the compulsory 
license and the Copyright Office’s corresponding regulations (2) in order to keep pace 
with advancements in the music industry, the use of the § 115 compulsory license has 
steadily declined to an almost non-existent level.  It primarily serves today as merely a 
ceiling for the royalty rate in privately negotiated licenses.290 
In her 2005 testimony, the Register of Copyrights 
recommended amending § 115 to provide for one-stop shopping for 
those seeking licenses.291  The proposed legislation would have 
established Music Rights Organizations (MROs) authorized to grant 
licenses.  Each MRO must have the power to authorize reproduction, 
distribution, and public performance rights, and each rights owner 
could designate only one MRO.292 This proposed legislation would 
eliminate the need for any compulsory license in the Copyright Act.  
 
 283.  See Stephanie Berg, Remedying the Statutory Damages Remedy for Secondary 
Copyright Infringement Liability: Balancing Copyright and Innovation in the Digital Age, 56 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 265, 278 (2009) (describing the legislative history of the 1909 Act). 
 284.  Skyla Mitchell, Note, Reforming Section 115: Escape From the Byzantine World of 
Mechanical Licensing, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1239, 1242 (2007). 
 285.  Id. 
 286.  Id. 
 287.  Id. at 1243. 
 288.  17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006). 
 289.  Mitchell, supra note 286, at 1242. 
 290.  Music Licensing Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and 
Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 15 (2005) [hereinafter Music 
Licensing Reform] (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, US Copyright Office). 
 291.  Mitchell, supra note 286, at 1263-64 (describing proposals). 
 292.  Id. at 1267-69. 
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The music publishers responded with their own proposed legislation, 
which emphasized a blanket license to replace song-by-song licensing 
for digital transmission.293  The political climate in the Congress was 
such that it enacted none of the proposals. 
Earlier, Congress had enacted § 114,294 which established a 
compulsory licensing scheme for digital audio transmissions of sound 
recordings.295  Section 114 affords copyright owners of sound 
recordings the exclusive right to perform their works publicly by 
means of digital audio transmissions, subject to “a statutory license 
that permits certain eligible subscription, nonsubscription, satellite 
digital audio radio services, and business establishment services to 
perform those sound recordings publicly by means of digital audio 
transmissions.”296  It provides an antitrust exemption for collective 
negotiation of license terms.297  It vests the Copyright Royalty 
Judges298 with authority to determine reasonable rates for the 
compulsory licenses in the absence of negotiated agreements.299  This 
legislation limits the scope of the compulsory license, excluding 
interactive services.300  The D.C. Circuit, in reviewing a rate set by the 
Royalty Judges, explained the parameters for their decision making: 
When establishing terms and rates under that license, the Copyright Act requires the 
Board to balance four general and sometimes conflicting policy objectives: (1) 
maximizing the availability of creative works to the public; (2) providing copyright 
owners a fair return for their creative works and copyright users a fair income; (3) 
recognizing the relative roles of the copyright owners and users; and (4) minimizing any 
disruptive impact on the industries involved.301 
In Beethoven.com LLC v. Librarian of Congress, the court of 
appeals rejected challenges to an arbitral decision setting compulsory 
license rates for webcasting.302  In denying intervener status to 
challengers who had not participated in proceedings before the 
arbitral body, the court noted that “any person entitled to a statutory 
 
 293.  Id. at 1271. 
 294.  Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 
Stat. 336 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(6), 114 (2006)). 
 295.  17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2). 
 296.  Notice and Recordkeeping for Use of Sound Recordings Under Statutory License, 76 
Fed. Reg. 21833, 21833 (proposed Apr. 19, 2011) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 370, 382) 
(footnote omitted) (characterizing § 114). 
 297.  17 U.S.C. § 114(e)(1). 
 298.  See Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 574 F.3d 748, 753 
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (describing statutory authority of Board). 
 299.  17 U.S.C. § 114(f). 
 300.  Id. § 114(d). 
 301.  Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Librarian of Cong., 608 F.3d 861, 864 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010) (paraphrasing 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1)(A)-(D)). 
 302.  Beethoven.com LLC v. Librarian of Cong., 394 F.3d 939, 954 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
56 VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW [Vol. 14:1:1 
 
license may become a party to the . . . rate-setting proceedings by 
submitting ‘relevant information and proposals.’”303 
In Intercollegiate Broadcast System, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty 
Board, the D.C. Circuit reviewed royalty rates set by the Board for 
webcasting of sound recordings.  It rejected a challenge based on the 
Board’s alleged failure to consider price labels in a perfectly 
competitive market.304  It also rejected a challenge based on the 
Board’s imposition of a per-performance royalty instead of a royalty 
based on a percentage of revenues.305  On the other hand, it rejected 
the minimum annual fee per channel set by the Board as arbitrary 
and capricious.306  These cases show the factors that must guide any 
governmental decision making about reasonable rates for licenses. 
The copyright collective consent decrees, considered in Part  
IV.D.1, contain mechanisms for determining license rates by the 
district court that approved the decrees, popularly known as the “rate 
court.”307  If ASCAP and a putative licensee are unable to agree on a 
fee within sixty days, the applicant may apply to the district court for 
a determination of a reasonable fee, with ASCAP having the burden of 
proving reasonableness.308 
In United States v. ASCAP, the court of appeals vacated in 
material part a district court reasonable royalty determination under 
the consent decree.309  The case arose when negotiations between 
Internet disseminators of music and video, including Yahoo!, Real 
Networks, and ASCAP, broke down over the appropriate royalty for 
Internet distribution of copyrighted music.310  The court of appeals 
found that the district court failed to provide a sufficient rationale to 
 
 303.  Id. at 943. 
 304.  Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 574 F.3d 748, 757 (D.C. 
Cir. 2009). 
 305.  Id. at 760-61. 
 306.  Id. at 762. 
 307.  Section 513 allows small businesses to obtain a judicial determination of the 
reasonableness of license fees offered by a performing rights society subject to the consent decree. 
17 U.S.C. § 513 (2006). A small business is an “individual proprietor who owns or operates fewer 
than 7 non-publicly traded establishments in which nondramatic musical works are performed 
publicly.” Id. 
 308.  Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1979). 
 309.  United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 627 F.3d 64, 64 (2d 
Cir. 2010); see also In re Application of MobiTV, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 2d 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(determination by consent-decree rate court of reasonable fees for compulsory license by ASCAP 
and others, after a bench trial). 
 310.  United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 485 F. Supp. 2d 
438, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (summarizing history of litigation), aff’d, 627 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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support its formula for streaming uses.311  In setting a rate for 
delivery of television programming to smart phones, the court said: 
The task at hand is to determine the fair market value of a blanket license for the public 
performance of music.  The challenges of that task include discerning a rate that will 
give composers an economic incentive to keep enriching our lives with music, that avoids 
compensating composers for contributions made by others either to the creative work or 
to the delivery of that work to the public, and that does not create distorting incentives 
in the marketplace that will improperly affect the choices made by composers, inventors, 
investors, consumers and other economic players.312 
The proposals for reforming §§ 115 and 114 do not go far 
enough to help Blake; they are limited to sound recordings.313  On the 
other hand, some of their concepts can be expanded, as the proposed 
legislative and interpretive proposals at the end of this Article 
suggest.314  Those concepts include not only the statutory manner of 
granting a compulsory license, but also the factors that Congress must 
consider in setting terms for it. 
3. Flexibility Under Existing Law 
Existing law provides some flexibility for shielding Blake from 
some of the more egregious outcomes.  A recent Supreme Court 
decision says that injunctive relief against copyright infringers is not 
available automatically, but only after the application of traditional 
equitable factors.315  The damages provisions of the Copyright Act 
provide some flexibility for molding compensatory damages against 
Blake so that they resemble what would have been a fair royalty if he 
had been able to clear rights with an identifiable rights holder who 
had bargained in good faith.316 
a. Conditioning Injunctive Relief on Equity 
In eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, the Supreme Court, 
disagreeing with the Federal Circuit, held that the district court had 
properly denied a preliminary injunction in a patent infringement 
case.317  It specifically noted that the same equitable principles 
 
 311.  Id. at 10. 
 312.  MobiTV, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 209. 
 313.  17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (2006) (governing sound recordings); Id. § 115(a) (governing 
phonorecords of non-dramatic musical works). 
 314.  See infra Part VI. 
 315.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 316.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 317.  eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 388 (2006). 
58 VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW [Vol. 14:1:1 
 
condition injunctive relief in copyright cases.318  Justice Kennedy, 
joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, concurred, noting the 
abuse that automatic injunctive relief spawns: “[A]n injunction, and 
the potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be 
employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies 
that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent.”319 
The same analysis applies when a copyright holder is not active 
in a particular market, but simply seeks to block another’s 
exploitation of that market.  In Salinger v. Colting, the court of 
appeals agreed with the district court on the plaintiff’s probability of 
success, while vacating a preliminary injunction and remanding for 
consideration of irreparable injury and the public interest.320  The 
court of appeals, following eBay, considered four equitable factors: 
probability of success, likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of 
an injunction, whether the balance of hardships tilts in the plaintiff’s 
favor, and the public interest.321  In the balance-of-hardships analysis 
a court must consider: (1) the harm to the parties’ legal interests, and 
(2) whether the damages can be remedied after a final adjudication, 
either by damages or a permanent injunction.322  The court also 
reiterated eBay’s concurrence, noting that constraining injunctive 
relief through equitable principles enables courts to accommodate 
“innovation in this rapidly changing technological area.”323 
These preconditions for injunctive relief form the heart of the 
proposed interpretive solutions for Blake, developed in Part VI.B, 
below. 
b. Damages Discretion 
Section 504 of the Copyright Act authorizes either 
compensatory damages or statutory damages.324  Subsection (b) 
authorizes an award of “actual damages,” and “any profits of the 
 
 318.  Id. at 391-93 (“[A] plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a 
four-factor test before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has 
suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are 
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between 
the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest 
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”). 
 319.  Id. at 395-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 320.  Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 70 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 321.  Id. at 81-83. 
 322.  Id. at 81. 
 323.  Id. at 82. 
 324.  17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006) 
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infringer that are attributable to the infringement.”325  In computing 
profits, the copyright owner has the burden of proving gross revenue, 
while the accused infringer has the burden of proving “deductible 
expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors other than 
the copyrighted work.”326 
The profits element of damages would limit Blake’s damages 
liability to the net profit attributable to only those parts of his movie 
that are infringing.  In other words, the compensatory damages 
awardable for use of “Happy Birthday” would be computed based on 
how much the inclusion of the song increased Blake’s profits. 
The statutory damages provision authorizes an award ranging 
from $750 to $30,000 for each infringement, but gives the court 
discretion to award up to $150,000 for each instance of willful 
infringement.327  When the accused infringer proves that he had no 
reason to believe that his acts constituted infringement, the court has 
discretion to reduce statutory damages to $200.328  The text does not 
make it clear whether the reduced amount of $200 refers to the total 
award of statutory damages or to the per-infringement amount.329  
Statutory damages are available only for post-registration 
infringement.330  This shields Blake from large damage awards with 
respect to unregistered copyright interests. 
This flexibility with respect to damages provides the second 
major leg of the interpretive approach spelled out in Part VI.B, below.  
The proviso allowing reduction of statutory damages could benefit 
Blake only if he has a plausible argument that he thought his use of 
 
 325.  Id. § 504(b); see also On Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 161-62 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(stating that the statute authorizes reasonable royalties as compensation for copyright owner’s 
loss and defendant's profits as disincentive to infringe, but not for duplicative recovery when 
they overlap). 
 326.  17 U.S.C. § 504(b). 
 327.  Id. § 504(c); see also Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 355 
(1998) (holding 17 U.S.C. § 504 unconstitutional to the extent it did not entitle parties to jury 
trial of statutory damages criteria and amount). 
 328.  17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). 
 329.  See id. (“In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court 
finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts 
constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of 
statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200.”). 
 330.  Derek Andrew, Inc. v. Poof Apparel Corp., 528 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 2008) (joining 
other circuits and denying statutory damages because first act of infringement occurred before 
registration and post-registration infringement was part of continuing infringement); Mason v. 
Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 143-44 (5th Cir. 1992) (affirming denial of statutory 
damages for acts of infringement occurring before registration of infringed work); New Name, 
Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., No. CV 07-5034 PA (RZx), 2008 WL 5587487 at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 
2008) (denying statutory damages because post-registration infringements were part of conduct 
beginning before registration; observing need to create incentive to register). 
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the preexisting works was fair use.331  In order to be eligible for 
reduced statutory damages, he would need to argue the expansive 
interpretation of fair use as described in this Article.332  There is some 
flexibility, nevertheless, in the damages provisions of the Act to allow 
a court to mold damages to resemble a fair royalty. 
D. Institutionalizing Collective Action 
In the context of Blake’s dilemma, collective action could be 
institutionalized in two ways: by facilitating group action by rights 
owners, or by facilitating group action by persons situated similarly to 
Blake.  Institutionalizing collective action could benefit Blake: (1) it 
reduces transaction costs otherwise resulting from fragmentation of 
ownership and dispersion of new creators who want licenses, and (2) it 
provides a mechanism for managing holdouts.  It also can adjust 
relative bargaining power.  Because some rights holders are large 
institutions such as Hal Leonard, movie studios, and record labels, 
while potential licensees, like Blake, are often small, bargaining power 
is skewed in favor of the large institutions.  When the smaller entities 
act collectively, they strengthen their relative bargaining power. 
Many models are available for structuring collective action.  
The most relevant are copyright collectives that are voluntarily 
organized and copyright collectives designated by the Copyright Act to 
administer compulsory licenses.333  Models outside the copyright 
context, though, can also provide insight into how collectives define 
the class of persons they represent, how they can be organized to 
reconcile the competing interests of their members, and how their 
decisions can be judicially reviewed.334  The law provides a structure 
for collective action in the employer-employee context through 
bankruptcy creditors’ committees, class action lawsuits, and 
interpleader.335 
Collective action can reduce transaction costs that otherwise 
would prevent efficient agreements.  The law can provide a shelter for 
collective action by extending immunity from antitrust law, as in the 
 
 331.  17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (“infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, 
that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted 
an infringement of copyright . . . .”). The only way Blake could meet this requirement is by 
showing that he reasonably believed that his conduct was privileged by fair use, given his 
conversations with his lawyer friends. 
 332.  See discussion infra Part VI.B.I. 
 333.  See infra Part IV.D.1. 
 334.  See infra text accompanying notes 356-360. 
 335.  See infra note 356. 
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case of copyright collectives and collective bargaining in the 
labor-management context.336  It also can extend collective action to 
address the holdout problem by making a collective the exclusive 
representative for a defined class of persons.337  In effect, exclusive 
representation results when all the members are bound by a collective 
decision, as in class action litigation. 
A bargaining collective could either serve as the exclusive or 
the non-exclusive representative of the members of the class that it 
represents.  Examples of both types of statutorily created collectives 
exist.  Trade unions (or other entities) representing employees are 
designated as exclusive representatives.338  The consent decree for the 
traditional copyright collectives mandates that ASCAP and BMI be 
non-exclusive representatives.339  Whenever representation by the 
collective is exclusive, the collective must have some internal 
mechanism for managing the holdout problem, and judicial review 
must provide for scrutiny of the legitimacy of the collective’s decision 
to disappoint a would-be holdout. 
1. Copyright Collectives 
A variety of copyright collectives represent rights holders who 
grant licenses by monitoring potential infringement in radio play and 
public performances and in collecting and distributing royalties.  In 
some circumstances a potential licensee may obtain a judicial 
determination as to whether the licensing fee demanded is reasonable.  
The features of these collectives could be extended directly to address 
Blake’s fragmentation problem, borrowing appropriately from their 
definition of membership classes, the scope of their authority, their 
exclusivity principles, their use of blanket licenses, and provisions for 
judicial review. 
ASCAP was organized in 1914 by composers worried that 
performances of copyrighted music were so numerous, widespread, 
and fleeting that it was infeasible for individual rights holders to 
negotiate licenses and to detect unauthorized uses.340  At the time 
ASCAP was formed, considerable doubt existed as to the scope of the 
 
 336.  See infra text accompanying notes 346-350. 
 337.  See infra text accompanying note 352. 
 338.  See infra note 356. 
 339.  See infra text accompanying note 364. 
 340.  Broad. Music, Inc. v Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 4-5 (detailing history of 
ASCAP). 
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public performance right in copyrighted musical works.341  After the 
Supreme Court settled the issue,342 in a suit brought by one of the 
founding members of ASCAP, the universe of potential infringements 
of the public performance right increased dramatically, intensifying 
the need for some institutional mechanism to manage the transaction 
costs of copyright enforcement.343 ASCAP took on that role.  BMI, 
owned by members of the broadcast industry, was organized in 1939 
as radio stations and networks grew restless over ASCAP’s licensing 
fees.344  It performs functions similar to those performed by ASCAP.345 
In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 
Inc., broadcasters sued these copyright collectives claiming that their 
collective licensing and enforcement activities violated the Sherman 
Act.346  Earlier antitrust litigation against the two groups had resulted 
in consent decrees that materially restricted their activities:347 
Under the amended decree, which still substantially controls the activities of ASCAP, 
members may grant ASCAP only nonexclusive rights to license their works for public 
performance. Members, therefore, retain the rights individually to license public 
performances, along with the rights to license the use of their compositions for other 
purposes . . . . BMI is in a similar situation. . . . The BMI decree[, however,] does not 
specify that BMI may only obtain nonexclusive rights from its affiliates or that the 
District Court may set the fee if the parties are unable to agree.348 
The Court described the practical realities of the market for licenses to 
copyrighted music, involving thousands of copyright owners and 
millions of compositions.  In such market structures, costs would be 
prohibitive if everyone had to negotiate individual licenses: 
 
 341.  John Church Co. v. Hilliard Hotel Co., 221 F. 229, 230-31 (2d Cir. 1915) (holding 
performance by live band not within scope of copyright because no fee was charged), rev’d, 
Herbert v. Stanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917). 
 342.  See generally Herbert v. Stanley Co., 242 U.S. 591, 593 (1917) (explaining that 
“performance of a copyrighted musical composition in a restaurant or hotel without charge for 
admission” does constitute a “performance for profit within the meaning of the act”). 
 343.  See ASCAP History, ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/about/history/1940s.aspx (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2011) (explaining why BMI was established). 
 344.  Tradition, BMI, http://www.bmi.com/about/entry/533105 (last visited Sept. 29, 2011) 
(“BMI was founded by radio executives to provide competition in the field of performing rights, to 
assure royalty payments to writers and publishers of music not represented by the existing 
performing right organization and to provide an alternative source of licensing for all music 
users.”). Both organizations license rights owned by their members under standard terms to 
persons that perform copyrighted music. See generally About BMI, BMI, http://www.bmi.com/ 
about (last visited Sept. 29, 2011); ASCAP Music History, ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/ 
licensing (last visited Sept. 29, 2011). 
 345.  Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 5. 
 346.  Id. at 4. 
 347.  Id. at 10-11. 
 348.  Id. at 11, 12 n.20. 
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A middleman with a blanket license was an obvious necessity if the thousands of 
individual negotiations, a virtual impossibility, were to be avoided.  Also, individual fees 
for the use of individual compositions would presuppose an intricate schedule of fees and 
uses, as well as a difficult and expensive reporting problem for the user and policing 
task for the copyright owner.  Historically, the market for public-performance rights 
organized itself largely around the single-fee blanket license, which gave unlimited 
access to the repertory and reliable protection against infringement.  When ASCAP’s 
major and user-created competitor, BMI, came on the scene, it also turned to the 
blanket license.349 
Because of its practical necessity and its proven utility, the 
Court was unwilling to subject collective licensing to per se antitrust 
illegality, rather subjecting it to “a more discriminating examination 
under the rule of reason.”350  Collective licensing for copyrights has 
received broader approval by the Court, Congress, and the Copyright 
Office.  The BMI Court noted Congressional reliance on copyright 
collectives in specific instances.351  The Copyright Office designated 
SoundExchange as the agent to receive statements of account and 
royalty payments from licensees under the compulsory license for new 
digital subscription services.352  In her testimony on licensing reform, 
Marybeth Peters, the Register of Copyrights, advocated use of 
collectives to allocate and distribute royalties under her recommended 
reform of the statutory licensing mechanisms for recorded music.353 
In all of the instances in which they are available, copyright 
collectives reduce transaction costs for the participants.  They reduce 
or eliminate search costs; they eliminate the negotiation costs of 
dealing with multiple rights holders; and they reduce or eliminate the 
negotiation and administrative costs for licensees by proving standard 
terms.  The existing copyright collectives are of little use to Blake, 
however, because the medium he utilizes (audiovisual work) is not 
covered by the existing schemes and the types of rights he seeks to 
license (musical works, sound recordings, dramatic works, and literary 
works) are only partially covered.  Nevertheless, the well-developed 
elements of collective action, in copyright and in other contexts, can be 
adapted to reduce Blake’s transaction costs, either through the 
 
 349.  Id. at 20-21 (internal citations omitted). 
 350.  Id. at 24. 
 351.  Id. at 15-16 (“Congress created a compulsory blanket license for secondary 
transmissions by cable television systems and provided [antitrust immunity]. And the newly 
created compulsory license for the use of copyrighted compositions in jukeboxes is also a blanket 
license, which is payable to the performing-rights societies such as ASCAP unless an individual 
copyright holder can prove his entitlement to a share. Moreover, in requiring noncommercial 
broadcasters to pay for their use of copyrighted music, Congress again provided that 
‘notwithstanding any provision of the antitrust laws’ copyright owners ‘may designate common 
agents to negotiate, agree to, pay, or receive payments.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 352.  37 C.F.R. § 262.4(b) (2011). 
 353.  See Music Licensing Reform, supra note 290. 
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creation of new copyright collectives to cover use of any kind of work 
in a movie, or as a model for determination of fair licensing rates. 
2. Limitations of Collective Action Models 
Any system for collective action must: (1) deal with the 
possibility that collective action violates the antitrust laws,354 (2) 
define the class represented and determine whether members can opt 
out of collective representation,355 (3) provide for selection of the 
representative,356 (4) specify the “subject matter jurisdiction” (subjects 
of bargaining) of the process,357 (5) impose duties on the representative 
 
 354.  Existing copyright collectives enjoy antitrust immunity either under the statute, as 
for digital audio broadcasts, or pursuant to consent decrees, as for ASCAP and BMI. See 
discussion supra Part IV.D. Collective bargaining in the employer-employee context is exempt 
from the antitrust laws. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 235-37 (1996) (explaining 
“statutory” and “non-statutory” labor exemptions from antitrust laws). 
 355.  Opt-out operates for ASCAP, but not for the digital audio broadcast regime. In labor 
management collective bargaining, individual employees lose the power to bargain for the best 
price for their labor. See generally J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944) (concluding that 
private contracts are invalid when in conflict with collective bargaining agreement or NLRB's 
procedures). 
 356.  The National Labor Relations Board has the authority to define the class of 
employees to be represented exclusively by a bargaining agent, and administers processes for 
designating the bargaining agent. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2006). Collective action in bankruptcy occurs 
through creditors’ committees, which play a “vibrant and central role” in Chapter 11 
reorganization proceedings. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. 
Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 562 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc). The US trustee must appoint “a committee 
of creditors holding unsecured claims and may appoint additional committees of creditors or of 
equity security holders as the US trustee deems appropriate.” 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1). Compare In 
re Dana Corp., 344 B.R. 35 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (rejecting motion for additional creditors’ 
committee), with In re Park West Circle Realty, LLC, No. 10-12965 (AJG), 2010 WL 3219531 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2010) (finding no abuse of discretion but granting motion of largest 
unsecured creditor to be added to committee). The US trustee is a Justice Department official 
“whose role is to be a watchdog in bankruptcy proceedings.” In re South Beach Sec., Inc., 606 
F.3d 366, 370 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3) (2006)).In class action lawsuits under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, classes must be defined to determine the scope of those represented, and the 
process must provide a mechanism for managing holdouts, either by allowing them to opt out of 
the class or to receive a fair judicial hearing on their objections to a class-based outcome. FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23. Class actions meeting the basic requirements of commonality, typicality, and 
adequacy of representation are divided into three categories. Id. Two of them, under subsections 
(b)(1) and (b)(2) are “mandatory” in the sense that a class member dissatisfied with the result 
may petition the court hearing the action and present objections. See id. The third, subsection 
(b)(3), entitles class members to notice of the action and gives them the power to “opt out”—to 
elect not to be represented as a member of the class. Id. 
 357.  The scope of bargaining for copyright collectives is defined either by the voluntary 
agreement setting up the collective, or by statute. See 17 U.S.C. § 114 (d)(3) (limiting duration of 
exclusive licenses); 17 U.S.C. § 114(e) (granting antitrust immunity for negotiation of royalty 
rates, license terms and conditions, division of royalties, and designation of collective agents); 
Articles of Association of the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, ASCAP, 
art. III, § 5 (May 2002), http://www.ascap.com/members/governingDocuments/pdf/articles.pdf 
(requiring members to authorize ASCAP to license, on non-exclusive basis, non-dramatic public 
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to represent everyone fairly,358 and (6) determine the remedy if 
collective bargaining cannot produce agreement.359 
Federal interpleader provides another specialized mechanism 
for collective action, when two or more persons claim competing rights 
in the same piece of property.360  It could help Blake resolve competing 
claims to the identical right in the same preexisting work,361 by forcing 
competing claimants to negotiate among themselves under the shadow 
of a judicial adjustment of their competing claims. 
 
performance of members’ works). “Mandatory subjects of bargaining” are defined in labor 
management collective bargaining by the statute. 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
 358.  The ASCAP and BMI consent decrees regulate the duty of the collective to its 
members. The duty of fair representation, implied under the Railway Labor Act, Merritt v. Int’l 
Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 613 F.3d 609, 619 (6th Cir. 2010), the National Labor 
Relations Act, and Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967), requires the union “to serve the 
interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion 
with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct. This duty applies in all 
contexts of union activity, including contract negotiation, administration, enforcement, and 
grievance processing. A breach of the duty of fair representation occurs only when a union's 
conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad 
faith.” Merritt, 613 F.3d at 619 (citations omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted) (rejecting 
fair representation challenge under Railway Labor Act for favoring one group in airline merger); 
see also Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 343 (1953) (finding no breach of duty under 
National Labor Relations Act for singling out veterans for generous seniority). In class action 
lawsuits, the court adjudicates any objections to the “adequacy of representation.” Arreola v. 
Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 799 (7th Cir. 2008) (reversing certification of class because named 
representative had insufficient stake in outcome). 
 359.  The labor statutes provide no mechanism for resolving impasses. Ellen Dannin & 
Clive Gilson, Getting to Impasse: Negotiations Under the National Labor Relations Act and the 
Employment Contracts Act, 11 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 917, 922 (1996). The remedy is a strike or a 
lockout, which is expected to impose increasing pressure on the parties to agree. Id. at 939. 
Bankruptcy presupposes insolvency. That means that if the property of the debtor is liquidated 
in a Chapter 7 proceeding, the creditors will receive only a portion of their claims under 
priorities for distribution established by the statute. See 11 U.S.C. § 726. In a Chapter 11 
reorganization proceeding, a reorganization plan reduces the value of claims, typically by 
extending the time for payment, reducing the amount of claims, and adjusting priority of claims. 
See generally Chapter 11: Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Code, US COURTS, http://www. 
uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter11.aspx (last visited Oct. 13, 
2011) (providing background information about Chapter 11). Creditors committees allow 
participation by those whose property interests will be eroded. See generally id. Ultimately the 
bankruptcy court decides the fair “price” for the claims. See generally id. 
 360.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22 allows a plaintiff to sue “[p]ersons with claims 
that may expose a plaintiff to double or multiple liability” by joining them as defendants and 
requiring them to “interplead.” FED. R. CIV. P. 22(a)(1). Interpleader under this rule is 
permissible even though “(A) the claims of the several claimants, or the titles on which their 
claims depend, lack a common origin or are adverse and independent rather than identical; or 
(B) the plaintiff denies liability in whole or in part to any or all of the claimants.” FED. R. CIV. P. 
22(a)(1)(A)-(B). Interpleader is available to resolve certain copyright disputes. See Mills Music, 
Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153 (1985) (deciding respective rights of heirs and publisher in 
derivative work based on sound recording as to which assignment of renewal rights had been 
terminated). 
 361.  A defendant may file an interpleader counterclaim. FED. R. CIV. P. 22(a)(2). 
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If the political will exists to expand mechanisms for collective 
action to include Blake’s licensing problems, ample models exist for 
addressing these requirements inside and outside the copyright realm. 
Copyright collectives and the other models for collective action, 
however, reflect market conditions quite different from those 
confronting Blake.  The impossibility of thousands of negotiations and 
the costs of an intricate schedule of fees and terms, referred to by the 
Supreme Court in CBS, justified ASCAP and BMI collectives.362  The 
solution they vindicated was a blanket license, under which the 
licensee takes everything in the catalogue for a simple fee.363 
Blake does not want everything in the catalogue of large 
collectives.  His artistic judgment led him to choose only six 
copyrighted works.  The consumers of his movie will not pay to see the 
movie because they hope for a random assortment of hit tunes; they 
will come to see it because it tells a story, with occasional music to 
support the story. 
Moreover, the costs of the status quo to the rights holders today 
are much less than the costs of the status quo to the rights holders in 
1914.  In 1914, public performances were breaking out in venues all 
over the place and on radio stations cropping up in every small city.  
Blake and others like him are unlikely ever to reach large audiences.  
If they do, they will become prominent targets with enough capital 
and revenue at stake to make them worth suing individually for 
infringement. 
The economic and political justifications for use of collective 
licensing of copyrights needed by Blake are weaker than they are for 
the existing collective schemes.  While arguments can be made that 
transaction costs associated with licensing under the present system 
impose unacceptable social costs, the challenge of managing these 
costs efficiently is greater than the challenge of rebalancing power in 
labor-management relations, of assuring creditor participation in 
bankruptcy, or of providing for efficient enforcement of copyright 
against public performances in dance halls and on the radio.  
Moreover, the public policy justification for intervention is weaker 
than in the case of bankruptcy or widespread labor conflict, both of 
which engender considerable public outcry. 
Under the relevant consent decree, BMI and ASCAP have only 
non-exclusive authority to license works, and then, only if the rights 
 
 362.  See discussion supra Part IV.D.2. 
 363.  See discussion supra Part IV.D.2. 
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holder opts in.364  A rights holder will opt in only if collective action 
provides advantages for it in terms of reducing transaction costs.  
Such advantages are unlikely in Blake’s context.  Internet distribution 
of new works such as Blake’s movie makes it far easier for rights 
holders to detect prima facie infringement than it was in the early 
days of dance hall performances and local radio station broadcasts of 
musical works.  The RIAA’s scorched earth pursuit of individuals who 
download and share unlicensed music and the movie industry’s 
vigilant use of the DMCA takedown authority against YouTube 
suggest that rights holders may not perceive a need for licensing 
collectives.365  Thus, unless Congress compels collective licensing, as it 
did with digital audio recordings, collective licensing is unlikely to 
result from market forces.  On the other hand, as new technologies 
enable the proliferation of works in which copyright is owned by small 
entities, and also enable the proliferation of new works built on a 
foundation of preexisting works, collective action on both sides may 
become attractive. 
V. CRAFTING A SOLUTION FOR COPYRIGHT FRAGMENTATION IN 
ENTERTAINMENT WORKS: CONCEPTUAL PRINCIPLES 
This Part of the Article provides a framework for crafting 
solutions to the problems identified in earlier parts of the article, 
offering a conceptual foundation for the specific proposals in Part VII. 
It synthesizes the most useful features from the models analyzed in 
Part IV. 
Most of the proposals for dealing with the fragmentation and 
orphan works problems have focused on reducing search costs by 
creating a more comprehensive database of rights owners.  Most of 
them are insufficient in scope. For example, having identified the 
fragmentation problem, Professor Cardi proposes a modest solution: 
consolidating the licensing of musical composition rights and 
compulsory assignment of composition rights to any entity with the 
power to license music recording rights.366  More is necessary to fix the 
problem.  A student work proposes the establishment of an online 
 
 364.  Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 29 (1979) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 365.  Joseph S. Beckman, Your Internet Privacy Takes a Hit, THE INTELLECT LAW GROUP, 
http://www.intellectlawgroup.com/articles/internetprivacyhit.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2011) 
(discussing RIAA’s shutting down Napster and other music downloading services, and also using 
the DMCA to force Verizon to identify an anonymous user who infringed copyright by 
downloading over 600 songs in a day). 
 366.  Cardi, supra note 56, at 885-86. 
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clearinghouse with the power to license all desired works and rights 
for a single price, with recourse to a rate court in the event of 
impasse.367  The Register of Copyrights similarly proposed a “one-stop 
shopping” approach in her 2005 testimony on § 115.368 
Existing copyright registration databases can be made more 
complete by creating stronger incentives for rights holders to register 
their copyrights.  One such incentive can be a privilege for subsequent 
creators to use an unregistered work without facing liability for 
infringement unless the new creator has notice of the ownership of 
copyright in preexisting works and enough information to find the 
rights holder.  That essentially is the approach taken in the Register 
of Copyright’s Orphan Report.369 
Moving copyright toward a liability regime instead of a 
property regime will reduce transaction costs for Blake.  Calabresi and 
Melamed, in their classic “Cathedral” article,370 distinguished between 
“property regimes” and “liability regimes.”371  What distinguishes 
property from liability regimes is the availability of injunctions.372  An 
injunction against copyright infringement gives an unreviewable 
power to the rights holder to decide whether to grant a license, and if 
so, on what terms.  Instead, limiting the rights holder to damages 
would effectively allow use of the copyrighted work under a “royalty” 
defined by the measure of damages. 
Already, the availability of automatic injunctive relief, once 
liability is established, has been eroding.  Negligence law is one 
example.  Traditionally, “whenever the damage resulting from a 
nuisance is found not ‘unsubstantial’, viz., $100 a year, [an] injunction 
would follow.”373  The trend, however, is to take into account 
traditional equitable factors in determining whether a court should 
enjoin a nuisance.374 
The same trend is evident in the intellectual property arena.  
In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, analyzed more extensively in Part 
 
 367.  Brian R. Day, Collective Management of Music Copyright in the Digital Age: The 
Online Clearinghouse, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 195, 220-21 (2010) (describing details of 
clearinghouse). 
 368.  See Music Licensing Reform, supra note 290. 
 369.  See discussion infra Part VI.A.1. 
 370.  See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
 371.  Id. 
 372.  Id. 
 373.  See generally Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 872 (N.Y. 1970). 
 374.  See Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance: Past, Present, and 
Future, 54 ALB. L. REV. 189, 251 (1990) (reviewing evolution of nuisance law, and focusing 
particularly on Ellickson's proposal to eliminate injunctive relief in most cases). 
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IV.C.3, the Supreme Court embraced the usual four-factor test for 
injunctive relief375 in patent and copyright cases376 to avoid use of 
injunctions as leverage for extorting excessive license fees.  This is 
precisely Blake’s situation. 
In Blake’s case, equitable factors weigh against injunctive 
relief.  Refusal to license on fair terms tilts equity toward Blake on 
unclean hands grounds.  The hardship to Blake will be substantial if 
he is enjoined.  The hardship to the rights holders will be de minimis 
if injunctive relief is denied.  The public interest will be disserved if an 
injunction is granted because the public will be deprived of Blake’s 
creativity. 
The result would be that a person in Blake’s shoes could go 
ahead and use the preexisting work, recognizing that he may be sued 
for infringement.  If he is sued and liability results, he would have to 
pay a fair royalty, measured by the adverse impact of what he has 
done on the market for the preexisting work.  An injunction, however, 
would not be available if he made reasonable efforts to find and 
negotiate with the rights holders.  If they could not be located, or if 
they engaged in a holdup, no injunction would be available. 
Any regime for mandatory resolution of private negotiation 
impasses creates the risk that the negotiating parties will not bargain 
in good faith, believing that they can get a better deal from the 
impasse resolution institution than from the opposing party.  This is a 
well-understood problem with interest arbitration in the labor 
management context.377  In order to avoid this problem in the 
copyright licensing context, the law should provide incentives for both 
sides to negotiate license terms without resorting to governmental 
resolution.  The legislation proposed in Part VI provides an example of 
such incentives. 
A 2010 student work suggests adapting the concepts of the 
doctrine of prior appropriation in water rights, which replaced the 
doctrine of riparian use in the western United States, where water 
 
 375.  See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (“(1) [T]hat it has 
suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are 
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between 
the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest 
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”). 
 376.  Id. at 391 (quoting Federal Circuit on general rule); Id. at 392-93 (noting application 
to copyright cases). 
 377.  See Thomas Kochan et al., The Long Haul Effects of Interest Arbitration: The Case of 
New York State’s Taylor Law, 63 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 565, 566-67 (2010) (reviewing 
literature on adverse effects of interest arbitration in both private and public sectors). 
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was scarce.378  The premise is that “the pool of copyrighted works is all 
too finite.  Within a world of limited and decaying cultural resources, 
it seems inefficient that US copyright law grants absolute, 
near-perpetual monopolies to copyright owners who disappear into 
obscurity with all their exclusive yet unexploited legal rights 
fastidiously intact.”379  The student proposed a system in which rights 
holders still would have a monopoly so long as they actively “used” 
their works.380  “If [they] cease[] to exploit the copyrighted work and 
disassociate [themselves] to the point that the[ir] work[s are] 
orphaned by definition, then a beneficial-use analysis suggests that 
others should be able to move in and use [them].”381  He suggested 
referring to trademark law, which makes continued protection 
dependent on continued use in commerce.382 
The law can provide an incentive for rights holders to negotiate 
reasonable terms for licensing their copyright by weakening copyright 
protection for rights holders who do not provide data to the Copyright 
Office to enable potential licensees to find them and who do not 
bargain over license terms in good faith.  This could be done 
statutorily, but it also can be done through interpretation of the fair 
use privilege, discussed in Part VI.B.1, and in considering the 
equitable prerequisites for injunctive relief, considered in Part VI.B.2. 
None of the enumerated factors in § 107, codifying fair use, 
provides explicit authority for this consideration, nor does the caselaw 
applying those factors.  On the other hand, the language of § 107 says 
that the factors are not exclusive.383  “[The] [f]air use doctrine is an 
‘equitable rule of reason’; neither the examples of possible fair uses 
nor the four statutory factors are to be considered exclusive.”384 
The second factor, moreover, is broad enough to consider the 
social benefit resulting from a new creator who makes an out-of-print 
work available to the public.385  Logically, this aspect of the doctrine 
could be extended to a circumstance where a rights holder blocks 
public availability of a new work by refusing to license it on 
 
 378.  See Joel Sage, Note, Revenue Streams and Safe Harbors: How Water Law Suggests a 
Solution to Copyright’s Orphan Works Problem, 16 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 294 (2010). 
 379.  Id. at 311-12 (footnotes omitted). 
 380.  Id. at 314. 
 381.  Id. 
 382.  Id. (referring to 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1) (2006) (limiting trademark applications to 
marks “used in commerce”)). 
 383.  17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 384.  Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d 1287, 
1308 (11th Cir. 2008) (reversing district court and holding that strength of fair use defense was 
insufficient for summary judgment for defendant). 
 385.  See id. at 1313-14. 
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reasonable terms.  The “clean hands” equitable prerequisite for 
injunctive relief provides ample room to deprive an unreasonable 
rights holder of injunctive relief.386 
That leaves the problem of incentives for potential licensees.  
Requiring those seeking licenses to pay a supernormal price, say 120 
percent of what an adjudicator finds to be the fair market value, would 
provide a disincentive for potential licensees to prefer mandatory 
dispute resolution of license terms.  In addition, uncertainty always 
provides an incentive for negotiated resolution of disputes.  If neither 
party can predict with certainty the “Best Alternative to Negotiated 
Agreement,” they are more likely to agree with each other.387 
VI. A PROPOSAL 
Copyright never has been absolute.  After all, the Patents and 
Copyrights Clause of the US Constitution begins with a condition: “To 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . .”388  Further, it 
imposes the condition of “limited Times” on its grant of authority to 
the Congress to secure “to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings.”389  Congress regularly has limited the exclusive 
rights of copyright owners by imposing compulsory licensing schemes 
backed up by governmental determination of the reasonableness of 
proposed license fees, as discussed in Part IV.C.2.  The need to provide 
space for new creative effort and to assure the existence of competing 
channels for distributing creative work justifies these licensing 
regimes.390  Blake can make a similar argument for a compulsory 
license as a last resort to facilitate rights clearance.  He would argue 
that the same market failures that justified the existing statutory 
licenses exist in the market for licenses to works to be included in 
independent movies. 
Even though such an argument is plausible to make, 
independent filmmakers may not get far in trying to advance the 
 
 386.  Compare Saxon v. Blann, 968 F.2d 676, 680 (8th Cir. 1992) (affirming denial of 
injunction on unclean hands grounds to copyright owner who revised a book to undercut 
opportunities of licensee to earlier version of book), with Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 
F.3d 900, 910 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting argument that unclean hands was established by rights 
holder’s refusal to license trademark on royalty terms less favorable to licensor than other 
licenses for same mark). 
 387.  See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT 
WITHOUT GIVING IN (Penguin Books 1991) (1981) (using the term “Best Alternative to Negotiated 
Agreement”). 
 388.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 389.  Id. 
 390.  See discussion supra Part IV.C.2. 
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argument.  The existing compulsory licensing schemes, after all, have 
been adopted in a political context in which the licensees’ interests 
were well represented and well funded.  It is unlikely that the widely 
dispersed and underfunded community of independent moviemakers 
could get as much attention from the Congress.  Therefore, enactment 
of a compulsory licensing scheme to deal with Blake’s problem is 
unlikely.  Still, a comprehensive legislative solution is not the only 
possibility.  This Part offers proposed statutory changes and 
interpretive principles for existing law that would reduce Blake’s 
transaction costs while protecting the legitimate interests of rights 
holders. 
A. Statutory Amendments 
The Orphan Report recommended statutory language for an 
amendment to the Copyright Act. That recommendation is limited to 
the orphan works problem.  As this article explains, the market failure 
experienced by Blake goes beyond the orphan works problem; it also 
includes refusals to license and insistence on unreasonable license fees 
in conjunction with holdout behavior or otherwise.  This subsection 
reproduces the recommended statutory language from the Orphan 
Report, so that a reader may understand concretely how to address 
part of Blake’s problem by concretely circumscribing statutory 
remedies.  Then it offers broader statutory language to address the 
full range of Blake’s problems. 
1. Orphan Report Recommendation 
The Orphan Report’s recommendations provide a good starting 
point for amendments to the Copyright Act.  They do not go far 
enough however, because they address only search costs associated 
with orphan works. 
The Orphan Report recommended enactment of a new section 
to the Copyright Act as follows: 
SECTION 514: LIMITATIONS ON REMEDIES: ORPHAN WORKS 
(a) Notwithstanding sections 502 through 505, where the infringer: 
(1) prior to the commencement of the infringement, performed a good faith, 
reasonably diligent search to locate the owner of the infringed copyright and the 
infringer did not locate that owner, and 
(2) throughout the course of the infringement, provided attribution to the author 
and copyright owner of the work, if possible and as appropriate under the 
circumstances, the remedies for the infringement shall be limited as set forth in 
subsection (b). 
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(b) LIMITATIONS ON REMEDIES 
(1) MONETARY RELIEF 
(A) no award for monetary damages (including actual damages, statutory 
damages, costs or attorney’s fees) shall be made other than an order requiring 
the infringer to pay reasonable compensation for the use of the infringed work; 
provided, however, that where the infringement is performed without any 
purpose of direct or indirect commercial advantage, such as through the sale of 
copies or phonorecords of the infringed work, and the infringer ceases the 
infringement expeditiously after receiving notice of the claim for infringement, 
no award of monetary relief shall be made. 
(2) INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
(A) in the case where the infringer has prepared or commenced preparation of a 
derivative work that recasts, transforms or adapts the infringed work with a 
significant amount of the infringer’s expression, any injunctive or equitable 
relief granted by the court shall not restrain the infringer’s continued 
preparation and use of the derivative work, provided that the infringer makes 
payment of reasonable compensation to the copyright owner for such 
preparation and ongoing use and provides attribution to the author and 
copyright owner in a manner determined by the court as reasonable under the 
circumstances; and 
(B) in all other cases, the court may impose injunctive relief to prevent or 
restrain the infringement in its entirety, but the relief shall to the extent 
practicable account for any harm that the relief would cause the infringer due 
to the infringer’s reliance on this section in making the infringing use. 
(C) Nothing in this section shall affect rights, limitations or defenses to 
copyright infringement, including fair use, under this title. 
(D) This section shall not apply to any infringement occurring after the date 
that is ten years from date of enactment of this Act.391 
In describing its proposed legislation, the Report applied it to a 
hypothetical “subsequent creator,” which closely approximated the 
hypothetical in this article: 
Some examples include a filmmaker who takes an old screenplay and modifies it to 
create a new film, a book publisher that takes a manuscript and has another author 
write a novel based on that manuscript, or a songwriter who uses a poem as the lyrics to 
a song he composes.  In most cases this type of user will be making commercial use of 
the work, as it hopes to commercialize and exploit the derivative work it is creating.392 
The Report explains that if the user performs a reasonably diligent 
search, but still cannot locate the owner, it may go ahead with the 
use.393  Nevertheless, it still must attribute author and owner within 
the derivative work if it knows their identities.394  It should also “be 
prepared to pay reasonable compensation to the owner if she surfaces 
and makes a claim for infringement, given that in most cases the use 
 
 391.  ORPHAN REPORT, supra note 65, at 127. 
 392.  Id. at 124. 
 393.  Id. at 94. 
 394.  Id. at 110. 
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will be commercial and not eligible for the elimination of monetary 
relief for noncommercial uses.”395  The Report suggests a meritorious 
approach: conditioning remedies for infringement on making it easier 
for potential licensees to determine rights ownership and providing a 
safe harbor for those who make a diligent effort to identify rights 
owners. It does not go far enough, however, in addressing all the 
problems. 
2. More Comprehensive Amendment to the Copyright Act 
The following statutory language builds on the 
recommendation of the Orphan Report to cover the full range of 
problems confronted by Blake and analyzed in this article.  This 
proposal, drafted entirely by the author, goes beyond the Orphan 
Report proposal in the following respects: (1) instead of seeking to 
define a transformative work entitled to new privileges, it privileges 
new works that incorporate preexisting works as a relatively small 
part of the new work; (2) it explicitly privileges conduct like Blake’s as 
fair use, so long as the creator of the new work offers to pay the rights 
holder(s) a reasonable royalty; (3) it covers creators of new works who 
identify rights holders but who are unsuccessful in attempting to 
communicate with them or who make reasonable royalty proposals 
and are rebuffed; (4) it provides an incentive to negotiate reasonable 
license fees by authorizing damages of 120 percent of a reasonable 
royalty that a court determines would result from arms’ length 
negotiations; (5) it establishes a statutory license for creators of new 
works when the preexisting work has been licensed to others.  The 
proposal is as follows: 
 
Add the following new subsection to § 107 of Title 17: 
Incorporation of copyrighted material into new transformative work. 
The creator of a new work who incorporates preexisting copyrighted works as an 
integral but minor part of his or her new work shall be entitled to a Fair Use Privilege if 
he or she meets the following conditions: 
(1) Satisfies the requirements of section 112A, and 
(2) Offers to pay the rights holder for the preexisting work a reasonable royalty, 
determined in the absence of agreement under Subtitle 8. 
Add the following after section 112 of Title 17: 
Section 112A. Limitations on exclusive rights: Unsuccessful attempts to obtain license 
 
 395.  Id. at 124. 
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(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, an infringement of copyright by a 
person satisfying the requirements of subsection (b) shall subject the infringer to limited 
relief as provided in sections 501(c) and 504(e). 
(b) A person satisfies the requirements of this subsection when: 
(1) He engages in conduct exclusively reserved to the owner of a copyright under 
section 106, and 
(2) He has made a good faith effort to identify and to communicate with the owner 
of the copyright, and 
(A) He has been unable to identify the owner of the copyright, or 
(B) Has been unsuccessful in attempts to communicate with the owner of the 
copyright, or 
(3) He has communicated with the owner of the copyright and made a good faith 
offer to obtain a license, and the owner of the copyright unreasonably has refused 
his offer. 
Add the following to § 502 of Title 17: 
(c) Notwithstanding subsection (a) no injunctive relief shall be available against a 
defendant who satisfies the requirements of section 112A. 
Add the following to § 504 of Title 17: 
(e) Limitation on damages in cases involving section 112A.  Defendants satisfying the 
requirements of section 112A(b)(3) shall be liable only for damages representing 120 
percent of the amount of a royalty that would be negotiated between two parties 
negotiating in good faith in an arms-length transaction.396 
Add the following to Title 17: 
Section 115A. Compulsory license for material in new works 
(a) When a work has been distributed to the public in the United States under the 
authority of the copyright owner, any other person who has complied with the provisions 
of section 112A may obtain a compulsory license to make, distribute, and perform a new 
work created by that person. A person may obtain a compulsory license under this 
section only if his or her primary purpose for the license is to use the licensed work as 
an integral but small part of the new work. 
(b) Licenses obtained under subsection (a) shall be subject to the terms and conditions 
provided in 17 U.S.C. § 115 with respect to notice and royalty rates. 
If Congress enacted this legislation, Blake would be in the 
following situation: If he performs a good faith and reasonably diligent 
search for holders of rights in preexisting works and either cannot 
identify them or identifies them and they are unresponsive to his 
efforts to communicate with them, he is entitled to a fair use privilege.  
If the rights holder surfaces later, Blake is not liable for infringement.  
This provides an incentive for rights holders to facilitate discovery of 
their identities and to respond to requests for licenses. 
 
 396.  The 120 percent royalty is applicable only to a new creator who has succeeded in 
identifying the rights holder and communicating with her, but who has been unsuccessful in 
negotiating a reasonable royalty. 
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If he identifies and succeeds in communicating with a rights 
holder, but the rights holder refuses Blake’s offer of a license fee in the 
amount of a reasonable royalty, Blake is liable for 120 percent of what 
a court determines to be a reasonable license fee.  This proviso 
provides an incentive for Blake to offer a license fee that would be 
accepted by a rights holder. 
If a rights holder has licensed a preexisting work to others, 
Blake is entitled to a license on terms determined by the Copyright 
Royalty Judges. 
B. Interpretative Common Law Approaches 
As mentioned above, the likelihood of Congress amending the 
Copyright Act along these lines is small.  Potential licensees such as 
Blake are simply too weak politically to channel the legislative process 
in a direction favorable to them.  Rights holders dominate the 
Congressional process.  The asymmetry of political influence in favor 
of rights holders is well known.397 
Without amending the Copyright Act, the law still could 
provide an efficient regime for Blake and other creators of new works 
who encounter copyright clearance problems.  The following 
subsections suggest principles for interpreting the fair use and 
copyright misuse doctrines, which, in conjunction with suggested 
principles for injunctive relief and awarding damages, would produce 
results not greatly at odds with those under the proposed statutory 
amendments. 
1. Fair Use Principles 
When interpreting the fair use privilege under 17 U.S.C. § 107, 
a court should treat certain infringements as fair use when the alleged 
infringer is willing to pay a reasonable royalty to copyright owners for: 
(1) including the copyrighted work in a larger original work with 
 
 397.  Public choice theory seems to be practically tailor-made for the IP laws. The theory 
suggests that when interest groups are small, relatively homogenous, and have individually 
large interests at stake, these small groups will succeed in controlling government 
decision-makers much more effectively than larger groups that are more diverse and whose 
individual stakes are much less. Herbert Hovenkamp, Innovation and the Domain of Competition 
Policy, 60 ALA. L. REV. 103, 117 (2008) (arguing for a greater role for antitrust policy in the 
intellectual property field). “[I]t is hard to identify any recent innovation-related legislation with 
identifiable winners and losers in which capture has not been a central dynamic.” Stuart Minor 
Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1, 41 (2008); see Keith Porcaro, Note, Private Ordering and Orphan Works: Our Least Worst 
Hope?, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 15, ¶¶ 1, 50 (2010) (arguing that copyright legislation is 
certain to be skewed in favor of rights holders). 
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substantial new creative elements when the copyrighted work 
constitutes no more than 1 percent of the new work, (2) using 
characters or plot elements from the copyrighted work as the basis for 
characters or plot elements in the new work when the plot of the new 
work is substantially different from the plot of the copyrighted work, 
and (3) exploiting markets for the new work substantially different 
from the markets for the copyrighted work that the copyright owner 
has demonstrated an intent and the capacity to exploit. 
The proposed interpretation of the fair use privilege would 
protect only creators who use preexisting works as elements in a new 
work that has substantial new creative elements; as discussed above, 
fair use has been interpreted to disqualify new works that are not 
transformative.  Privileging Blake’s use would give a broader privilege 
to new works in which the use of preexisting works is a small part of 
the whole.  Conversely, an artist who simply remounts a play or 
reshoots a movie would fare worse than a new work wanting to use a 
couple of songs or a lead character in a new context. 
The copyright misuse defense, discussed in Part IV.A.4 above, 
would cover a rights holder who arbitrarily declines to license a work 
for inclusion as an integral, yet minor, part of a transformative new 
work or who insists on unreasonable terms.  Such conduct by a rights 
holder inhibits fair competition by limiting consumer access to new 
creative works and by limiting entry by creators of new works into 
new markets. 
2. Equitable Principles for Injunctions 
A moviemaker who bodily incorporates substantial amounts of 
copyrighted material without any attempt to document fair use or to 
obtain licenses would be subject to an injunction.  On the other hand, 
a moviemaker who documents a plausible fair use privilege, attempts 
to obtain licenses but cannot find the rights holder despite diligent 
search, or finds the rights holder and attempts in good faith to 
negotiate a reasonable license without success, would not be subject to 
an injunction.  At most, liability for damages would be measured by 
what a reasonable royalty would be.  In these limited circumstances, 
the proposal transforms intellectual property from a “property regime” 
to a “liability regime.”398 
 
 398.  The classic distinction crystallized by Calabresi and Melamed in their classic 
“Cathedral” article. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 370. 
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3. Discretionary Principles for Damages 
When interpreting the statutory entitlement for actual 
damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504(b), a court should limit actual 
damages to a fair royalty amount, computed as a percentage of the 
profits earned by the infringer from the infringing work.  That 
percentage should reflect the market value of the portion of the 
copyrighted work included in the infringing work, relative to the 
market value of the infringing work as a whole.  Royalties actually 
negotiated for other copyrighted works included in the infringing work 
should be given substantial weight in determining “fair royalty.” 
When interpreting the statutory entitlement for statutory 
damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c), a court should construe the 
authority to reduce damages when the infringer made every 
reasonable effort to identify the copyright owner and to negotiate a 
fair royalty for a license to the copyrighted work.  The court should 
construe the $200 minimum to refer to the aggregate statutory 
damages for inclusion of the copyrighted work in the infringing work, 
without regard to the number of times the infringer publicly 
distributed, publicly displayed, publicly performed, or reproduced the 
infringing work. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The purposes of the Copyright and Patents Clause are 
frustrated because creators of new works wishing to use new 
technologies to build on prior creative effort confront a legal regime 
intertwined with older technologies and industry structures.  New 
creators seeking to license preexisting works face daunting 
transaction costs as they try to identify potential rights holders whose 
interests are fragmented, even with respect to a single preexisting 
work.  If a new creator succeeds in identifying rights holders, the 
battle has just begun.  Many are unresponsive to requests for licenses; 
others engage in strategic behavior, demanding license fees that are so 
large that they discourage creation of the new work. 
This Article begins with a story, permitting the problem to be 
considered in the context of a concrete effort to create a new work.  
The story involves a movie, but the problems it identifies apply as well 
to any kind of new work that seeks to incorporate preexisting works.  
Having set up the problem, this Article explains how the scope of 
copyright protection, combined with fragmentation of rights under the 
Copyright Act, inhibit new creative effort.  It explains that property 
law long has confronted the problems that exist in the markets for 
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intellectual property and has developed a variety of doctrines to 
mitigate the transaction costs that led to market failure.  It then 
focuses on possible models for solving the problems confronted by new 
creators, such as the one portrayed in the story, and it synthesizes 
some conceptual principles for crafting a solution in the context of new 
entertainment works.  It concludes with a proposal, including 
legislative amendments to the Copyright Act, and principles that 
could be applied to interpret the existing statute in the absence of 
Congressional action.  The proposed legislation and the principles 
afford a privilege for a new creator to use preexisting works when he 
cannot identify the holders of rights in the preexisting work, when he 
is unsuccessful in communicating with those rights holders, or when 
he proposes a reasonable royalty and is rebuffed.  It provides 
mechanisms, ranging from adjudication of fair license fees to 
restrictions on remedies available to rights holders, to encourage new 
creators and rights holders to work out agreeable terms privately in 
the market. 
The purpose of copyright law is to encourage and reward 
creative effort.  Current conditions frustrate achievement of that goal 
by making it easy for copyright owners to hide and then ambush 
creators of new works that build upon existing works.  Amendment of 
the Copyright Act or application of the interpretive principles 
proposed in this article would further the law’s purpose. 
 
